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1 Introduction
In the eastern Mediterranean region in the Bronze Age there were a number of societies that 
through cultural activities and trade and international agreements, participated in a regional 
exchange economy. This was based on the highly preferential metal bronze, which, with the 
other metals copper and tin (the components of bronze), gold, silver and lead were important 
exchange components for the whole economic system. This thesis assumes a bias to 
archaeometallurgy, and seeks to demonstrate the significance of the development of iron 
technology to the societies and the regional economy in the transition from the Bronze Age to 
the time when iron became the most used metal.
The eastern Mediterranean regional economy grew during the Late Bronze Age and 
seemed to function well, until its sudden collapse in about 1200 BC. The reciprocal impact of 
metallurgical developments are sought demonstrated by examining the societies and other 
factors in the region. Some of the more significant societies were the Hittites, Mycenae 
(Greece),  Cyprus and states in Syria and the Levant, as well as Egypt. Most of the complex 
societies were ruled by elites, and had centralised control of their growing economies by 
1500 BC. This control included commercial and religious affairs, as well as those which we 
today would call industrial. These latter included mining and production of metals and metal 
products. Since the elites controlled the absolute majority of the wealth of the society, it is 
probable that their control also extended into other spheres of the activities in which the 
population actively engaged.
From an early part of the BA, the elites acquired desired luxury goods through gift 
exchange, trade, looting or war. Thus the trade in luxuries benefited mainly the elites, who 
were connected in a “peer-polity” regional network. After a time of high and increasing 
prosperity,  this ultimately led to a systems collapse in the region, perhaps assisted by a 
dissatisfied populace  (van de Mieroop, 2010).
1.1  Background
Here the abbreviations used are IA= Iron Age, LBA=Late Bronze Age, BA=Bronze Age, and 
where used alone the term “bronze” means the copper-tin alloy. The pan regional collapse in 
about 1200 BC is hereafter called the PRC.
The region was plagued with unrest and war in the last 100 years of LBA, especially 
just before and during the PRC (Knapp, a, b,1992; Muhly, 1984; Sandars, 1978;  Artzy, 1987; 
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among others). The Egypt - Hittite war at Kadesh in northern Syria of about 1270 is an 
example. The Egyptians and Hittites vied for power over a base in the Levant/Syria. The 
Egyptians moved against the Hittites, but the result of the war was controversial, with neither 
Egypt nor Hytta being universally seen as a decisive victor (Bryce, 1998:251; McMahon, 
1989; Santosuosso, 1996; Goedicke, 1966; among others). In this struggle the Hittites used 
some iron weapons at a time when bronze was paramount. This demonstrates that iron was 
developed and accepted as weapon material, at least in the Hittite Kingdom at that time. A 
particularly important question in this respect is whether iron was a better material than 
bronze, or simply "good enough" for some uses, while still inferior to bronze in others. Could 
perhaps the Hittites not afford to use only bronze, or did they find iron to be of better quality 
for weapons than bronze, or some other reason?  This indicates the changes taking place in 
metallurgy at that time.
The Hittite Empire collapsed less than 100 years after the battle of Kadesh, as did 
the important city state of Ugarit, which was an important node in the network of ports and 
trading routes, both inland and maritime (Knapp, 1992(a):63). Both the Hittite Empire and 
state of Ugarit were important parts of the regional economy and elite network and control 
structure. Troubles were brewing in the region, and even the Egyptian Empire was struggling 
(van der Steen, 1996), though it was still a major power. There was widespread migration, 
and also the exploits of the "Sea Peoples"  in LBA (figure 1), who are said by some to be at 
least one of the reasons for the PRC (Karageorghis, 2002; Muhly, 1984; Sandars, 1978). 
These factors all point in the direction of social changes. The regional economy was under 
the control of the region's elites, and so these developments must raise the question of 
whether their control was slipping.
In times of social change it is possible that development of iron technology could 
have gained ground. It may be that it had failed to do so at an earlier period, solely because 
bronze was so solidly established as the metal of preference. But there might also be other 
reasons, e.g. connected to decay of the elite power. Possibly, the disturbances in the region 
might have caused greater spreading of iron technology. Among other effects are migration 
(Anthony, 1990), the phenomenon of the "Sea Peoples" (Sanders, 1978) and related elements 
such as  the development of commerce through history (Manning, 2005:77-90). It is not 
difficult to imagine that people on the move would have had increased need of metals for 
tools and weapons. It is perhaps reasonable in these circumstances to expect a growth of 
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interest in the use of iron, especially if bronze was more difficult to obtain.
The LBA ended with collapse. Some people believe that the IA started in about 1000 
BC, although others differ. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the new IA could start only 
about 200 years after a regional collapse, given present understanding of developments and 
knowledge of the production of iron. In short, to assess iron's popularity at that time it is not 
sufficient to solely examine metallurgical development but ignore social development.
The societies in the focus region in BA traded with other societies in the Near East, 
as well as neighbouring regions, from Afghanistan to Europe. In about 1300 BC growth in 
culture and economy in the eastern Mediterranean was rapid, culminating before 1200 BC . 
In its heyday the culture was an advanced and complex exchange economy (Negbi, 2005), 
but not much is known about the centuries after the collapse. The scribes disappeared with 
the palaces. The PRC was abrupt for most societies in the region, but Egypt fared better than 
most. It preceded the start of IA which was about the late eleventh century BC, by 100-200 
years. An early date for the start of IA is 1050 BC (Gilboa and Sharon, 2003).
Any kind of metallurgical activity in this period, either before or during the PRC, 
based on either archaeological material or texts, is relevant. Thus, both developments in 
smelting of copper for production purposes, and attempts to smelt iron or use meteorological 
iron for production will also be relevant. The important question is how developments in 
metallurgy affected societies in LBA or in the transition to IA
1.2  Chronology, stages in Iron Age definition and scope
The chronological start and ending of BA and IA in the various regions of the continent are 
not necessarily synchronous. For example, in northern Europe BA started later than in the 
Mediterranean (Eskildsen, 2012; Wertime and Muhly, 1980:xiii; Trigger, 1996:62-71; 
Waldbaum, 1978:19).
There is still some controversy about chronology, and this is potentially significant 
because of the dating of the Ulu Burun shipwreck, south of Kaş in Turkey. This was set to 
1305 BC in the conventional chronology by dendrochronological dating (see Pulak, 1998: 
213-214). The controversy centres on a book (James et al, 1991) claiming that the 
conventional chronology is wrong. See Trigger (1994), Snodgrass (1991), Ray (1992) and 
Kohl (1995), among others.  In this thesis the conventional chronology is followed.
For the relative development chronology for iron, specifically regarding the transition 
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to iron from bronze, and in answer to the question: “What actually defines the Iron Age?”, the 
suggestion by Snodgrass, (1980:336-7) is to use a stage system which (simplified) states:
• the first stage is when “working iron” is produced, i.e. the cutting edge of a tool is 
made of iron.
• the second stage is when working iron is present and used, but less frequently than 
bronze.
• the third stage is when iron is used more often than bronze, although bronze is still 
present. This is the Iron Age proper.
Based on this “stage” system, I would prefer in this thesis to put up an operational 
definition of the otherwise slightly vague definition of the first stage: i.e. stage 1 is when 
smiths have the knowledge to produce iron from its mined ores. This to differentiate between 
iron objects produced from meteoric iron, and those produced from iron ores excavated from 
the earth by mankind. This definition excludes many of the earliest iron objects. Stages 2 and 
3 remain as above.
The scope of this thesis is defined as exclusively the developments in LBA in the 
eastern Mediterranean region, and chronologically, specifically the period 1700 to 1000 BC.
1.3  Metallurgy and society
In the early phases of metallurgy, metalworkers were faced with highly complex chemical 
problems. Ores of high or low-grade metal content had to be treated differently, and to extract 
the metal one wanted, in as pure a condition as possible, was  not easy. The first metals they 
came into contact with were various forms of lead, copper, occasionally tin and iron. The 
latter, iron, was not the first ore that they came to work, because the early techniques with 
pyrotechnics could not melt iron to liquid state. All in all, the early metallurgists were faced 
with a staggering amount of metallic ores, and had to proceed by trial and error, in attempts to 
produce a product from them (Wertime, 1964; Muhly, 2006; Yalçın, 1999).
Technological development is closely coupled to a society's general development. As 
technology advances, so does the possibility of exploitation of new tools, materials and ideas 
expand (Dobres, 1995; Dobres and Hoffman, 1994; Geselowitz, 1993). This is only one side 
of the matter, the other being the means of the spreading of technology to other people. In 
LBA, ideas and technological development were spread by the mobility of specialists in times 
of war, by royal gift exchange and by the general movement of people (Moorey, 2001; 
Zaccagnini, 1983).
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Furthermore, the importance of economic matters or commercial matters are to be 
emphasised. The commercial arena was not as in present day commerce. Flow of high value 
materials such as metals and products made from them did also generate product innovation, 
wealth and capital investment. But all matters about the storage, development or exchange of 
high value materials were the prerogative of the palaces alone (Sherratt & Sherratt, 2001).
The development of iron through ascending stages (Snodgrass, 1980:336-7) to a 
more popular and utilitarian metal can only be properly understood if the culture that 
develops it is understood, or at least described. Also, at the same time as the complex 
societies of the eastern Mediterranean began to disappear in this period, iron itself began to 
appear more frequently in the archaeological record (or in written sources). But any 
connection between the two cannot be assumed without question. It is necessary to examine 
the spread of types of iron objects as well as the events in society at the same time 
(McConchie, 2004:12). Therefore some of the most relevant societies in the region are 
discussed in the following sections.
The period 1200 to 900 BC in the region is often referred to in a general fashion as 
the “Early Iron Age”. But the entire region was not synchronously attuned with the spread of 
iron technology. Different areas had reached different stages in development, but there was a 
significant spread of iron technology and types of objects. It is a period generally with much 
social disturbance and migration, and the activities of the “Sea Peoples” that spread 
confusion. The effect of the failure of major BA civilisations in the region and migrations 
from some parts to other parts heralded major changes in cultural, economic and political 
aspects of the region (Waldbaum, 1978:10-11).
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2  The eastern Mediterranean region - Cultures and societies in BA - LBA.
Metallurgy is an affair of mankind. It is done to generate the development and production of 
tools and objects that promote more effective service to people, for their activities, and also 
for their deities. It is not for human consumption (feeding). It is therefore closely linked to 
society, because a congregation of humans can make decisions to initiate metallurgical 
projects, and assign to them certain common resources such as the labour (work in man-days) 
of some people, and food and life support for the participants. Human creativity is a part of 
the process. Therefore, a broader, more inclusive view must be taken of the development of 
metallurgy in the region, especially as it concerns some of the societies and their 
contributions to metallurgy. The question of why the people in the Mediterranean in BA 
chose to develop iron at the same time that bronze was the most common and well 
established metal must be posed. 
2.1. The societies in Anatolia
Some of the societies in the northern and eastern parts were among the earliest users of iron 
in the region.  Some hypotheses about why this is so have been given by Wertime (1973:885).
• Anatolia was the first known organised production site of copper and silver, and of 
penetration of the sulphide zone.
• There are few other parts of the world with such resources of copper, lead, iron and 
other important metals/minerals. For example the south coast of the Black Sea has 
sands with high amounts of magnetite.
• Iron is difficult to process and the earliest methods were heating and hammering. 
Only the tribal societies of Anatolia had the necessary experience over time with 
experimentation, and processing of iron. A thousand years elapsed between the first 
experiments with iron and its full acceptance in society.
The cultures in this part of the region may also have been at the centre of the PRC, 
which might also be connected to the development of iron technology and the subsequent 
start of the Iron Age in about 1050-950.
The region of Anatolia has little or no tin deposits, and has been importing tin as long 
as they have needed it (Muhly, 1993). The mineral deposits and need for tin were important 
factors in the development of trade with lands far away, especially in the south east. By the 
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middle of the third millenium BC wealthy elites and important centres of civilization existed 
in Anatolia including Troy and Poliochnii in the north west (Bryce, 1998:8) as well as many 
others. Around 2300 BC there were some major upheavals in Anatolia, thought by some to be 
the result of indo-european newcomers. The matter of the origin of these newcomers and their 
entry points to Anatolia is controversial, but few if any compass directions have been 
excluded. In addition there is controversy about the time or times that they arrived.
2.2. The  Assyrian Colonies
These merchant colonies preceded the Hittite Kingdom, and controlled or traded with some 
iron-producing pre-Hittite societies. They probably set the stage for iron development in the 
region. They established and maintained contacts with Mesopotamia which were probably 
important for the development of later iron technology (Bryce, 1998:21-43).
 The Assyrian Colony period in Anatolia began very early in the second millennium, 
also marking the start of the written record, some 1.000 years after record keeping is known 
to have started in Mesopotamia. The Assyrian merchants produced tablets profusely. More 
than 15,000 had been discovered by about 1999. The Assyrian activity indicates  a strong 
connection between Anatolia and Assyria, and thence to other areas of the near east. It may be 
deduced that the political climate in the region was fairly stable, since the Assyrians were 
essentially interested in trading, and were sensitive about political and societal stability. If 
there was too much instability, they would pull out of mercantile activity in that area. They 
built up colonies and an administration, including an arbitration system to settle disputes 
(Bryce, 1998:21-25). Deposits of copper, lead, arsenic, nickel and other minerals were many, 
but tin was imported from south west Iran, Mesopotamia or Syria (Bryce, 1998:21-43). But 
nevertheless there is also the possibility of some import of tin and other metals by boat, 
possibly through Cyprus.
It is probable that the Assyrian trading connection was responsible for the import of 
tin, probably from SW Iran. But they were traders, so there were other goods they were 
bringing to merchants in Anatolia, e.g. textiles. These goods were exchanged for others 
including metals and minerals from Anatolia for transport to other parts on the trading route 
to Assyria and Mesopotamia. The Assyrians were interested in acquiring the copper, silver 
and gold that was to be found (mined) in Anatolia (Bryce, 1998:27). Their interests included 
iron, and they participated in manufacture of iron products in Anatolia (Wertime, 1973).
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The trading system included forms of transaction such as payment, debt and interest. 
In itself a complex part of any commercial exercise. There were taxes levied on caravans 
crossing the different territories. Although these might be seen as prohibitive, it must have 
been possible to turn a profit on these commercial enterprises, or they would have dried up. 
The palaces and kings that ruled the different territories had also to ensure safe passage for 
the caravans. But all the risks from brigands, disasters and other unforeseeable problems 
nevertheless had to be covered by the merchants themselves, as well as all levies and taxes 
that had to be paid en route. So the total result was that the trading continued as long as the 
profits were good and the risks and costs acceptable. As soon as this changed, then the traffic 
would probably have dried up (Bryce, 1998:21-43).
This traffic overland by caravan was from the region of Mesopotamia through 
northern Syria and to Anatolia, ending at the Black Sea coast. The areas neighbouring the 
routes were probably also able to participate in trade to various ports in the region, on the 
Black Sea and Mediterranean. By this means, the flow of information, new ideas, cultural 
developments and new products was probably also effective.
It also led to the development of relations between the various rulers of the territories 
it passed through. Agreements were reached between these rulers and cooperation to keep the 
roads and routes free of brigands etc. Unfortunately, there were also occasions when the local 
ruler (or vassal ruler) came himself in conflict with a neighbouring territory's ruler, or his 
own king, and this could lead to outright war. This tendency accelerated as time went on. 
Cities were destroyed, rebuilt and resettled, but the caravan routes continued for a long time, 
thus laying the basis for the commercial and cultural network that extended from the Black 
Sea coast to Mesopotamia, and probably further afield (Bryce, 1998:28-62). 
However, the increasing conflicts and wars led to the withdrawal of the Assyrian 
mercantile initiative. The merchants, their families, contacts and network of agreements and 
contract all ended shortly before the Hittite realm was founded in c.1620 BC. The situation in 
the region was dramatically changed with total disruption in Anatolia, following the 
termination of the Assyrian colony period. The relatively enlightened period of the Assyrian 
Colonies was replaced by several decades of darkness when written records cease, and of 
which little is known (Bryce, 1998:16, 42-64).
2.3  The  Hittite Empire
The Hittite Empire, after its foundation, became a power in the region with a high king on a 
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par with Egypt. There were several languages spoken in Anatolia, and several were of indo-
european origin, as was the written language of the Hittite court indo-european. It was also 
the language used for communication with the king of Ahhiyawa (Bryce, 1998:17). The 
Hittites controlled the polity of Ugarit (probably as a vassal state), which had a port with 
coastal marine traffic from many ports in the Mediterranean, as well as being a node for land 
transport to various other countries such as Hittite towns, Syria and the Levant.  The Hittites 
also had other vassal states, some of which were occasionally a source of  trouble. Other 
problematic relationships existed also, with the Ahhiyawa, to their west, and the kingdom of 
Assyria, to their east. They were at times hard pressed in retaining control over their own 
domains (Bryce, 1998).
The first proper state to develop iron was the Hittite Empire. It was a major complex 
society in the eastern Mediterranean, and traded domestic production of minerals and metals 
for other goods including textiles, produced abroad. Tin was important for the production of 
bronze, and came mostly along the same routes as the Assyrians had used previously. Written 
sources indicate 80 tons of tin import in a 50 year period, which would give about 800 tons of 
bronze.
This was a trading route that was important throughout the existence of the kingdom, 
and an access route that had high priority and strategic importance. If this route had been 
closed by another state, that alone would have caused major, perhaps insurmountable, 
problems. They had viceroy seats in 2 vassal states strategically placed to represent Hittite 
political and military power in the area of the trading routes. The Hittites were also frequently 
in the field in arms, in many parts of Anatolia, putting down insurrections in vassal states or 
other states' attempts to encroach upon their territory. The cover of Macqueen's book is 
iconic, showing a Hittite warrior with sword in one hand and the other clenched in a fist. This 
image is something that springs to mind when the Hittites are discussed (Macqueen, 1976).
The Hittite Empire was born in a time of struggle, and existed throughout its history 
with constant challenges to the leadership of its kings. There was only ever the one royal 
house in the kingdom, but there was internal intrigue and factional trouble making by persons 
wishing to gain more power or replace the ruling king. Syria was also a constant worry, and a 
country both Egypt and other neighbouring territories tried to gain control over. After the 
battle of Kadesh against Egypt (where the Hittites used some iron weapons), both sides 
claimed victory, but it was the Hittites who secured control over Syria. However, after some 
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years, Egypt tightened its grip on others of their vassal states in that region, and the threat of a 
renewed conflict was ever prevalent. Other states or cultures which were potentially 
significant enemies were Babylonia, Assyria, Ahhiyawa, Kaska, Lukka and the Hurrians. 
However, the king Tudhaliya gained the throne in 1227, and in the course of his reign 
regained control of Cyprus and imposed a tributary regime. It seems that Tudhaliya's reign 
was relatively successful, with more accomplished than some of his better known ancestors.  
He was successful in limiting the power of the Ahhiyawa in western Anatolia, and rebuffed 
some attempts by Assyria to impinge on the Hittite domains. It is not easy to see in his reign 
any signs of the collapse that was to follow shortly afterwards (Bryce, 1998).
The next Regent was a son of Tudhaliya, Arnuwanda (III), died after a year, so that 
the reign was passed to another son of Tudhaliya, named Suppiluliuma (II). He faced unrest 
both internally, perhaps brought on by food shortage, and externally. The task he was 
confronted with was enormous. One of Suppiluliuma's big problems was the Ahhiyawa, 
situated in western Anatolia but with a base in Greece (see next section). 
The Hittite Empire was more or less in the central part of Anatolia with access to 
surrounding sea areas through their vassal states, although they had no navy. There were at 
least two military campaigns to put down unrest on Cyprus, and make the king of Cyprus 
submit to Hittite authority. These included tribute to be paid to the Hittite king. Probably the 
Hittites considered Cyprus as a vassal state (Knapp, 1980).
Nevertheless the Hittites were good at diplomacy, first trying to persuade or coerce 
vassal states to comply with Hittite wishes, and only going into the field against them when 
the situation was deadlocked, and they felt they had to have a solution to a critical problem. 
The area controlled by the Hittites in the 2nd millenium BC, either themselves directly, or 
through vassal states was most of Anatolia except the area near the sea of Marmara in the 
north-west (where there is a land connection to modern Istanbul), and excepting the area 
controlled by the Ahhiyawa. On the eastern side from the south coast of the Black Sea down 
to Assyria and circumscribing the Syrian desert as it was then, and down to about Kadesh.
2.4  The Ahhiyawa
The Ahhiyawa are still something of a mystery. However, it is currently believed that they 
were centred near Corinth, in Greece. The Ahhiyawa were almost certainly Mycenaean, 
although that doesn't necessarily mean all Mycenaeans. The Mycenaean people were possibly 
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divided into several kingdoms, such that the Ahhiyawa were only one such kingdom. The 
current understanding is that the core of the Ahhiyawa was at Mycenae, the main port was at 
Tiryns, and a large population in the area near Corinth, centred on Mycenae. The rest of the 
scattered kingdom was the Dodecanese islands and part of western Anatolia (Bryce, 1998:60-
61; Mountjoy, 1998:51). The Ahhiyawa were active in western Anatolia, although it wasn't to 
the advantage of the Hittites, whose vassal states were raided by them. These raiding 
activities were also carried out in Anatolia  and the Levant (Macqueen, 1996) by the 
Mycenaeans, something made possible by their marine capabilities.
There is a controversy about whether the Ahhiyawa were actually Mycenaean (a 
theory supported by some, e.g. Bryce (1998:60-61), Mountjoy (1998:51), but rejected by 
others e.g. Macqueen (1996:40-41).  Mountjoy (1998) believes the Ahhiyawa was either a 
culture on mainland Greece, or it was possibly a maritime kingdom that stretched from 
Miletos to Rhodes, and included parts of coastal Anatolia. Also that the Ahhiyawa were 
acculturated to some degree as Mycenaeans (based on similarities in pottery). Mountjoy is 
also open to the idea that the boundaries of Ahhiyawa changed through time. It is easy to 
understand that this could be the case, since the boundaries of what is in fact an archipelago 
might well change as naval supremacy and aggression changed in the region. In this thesis the 
hypothesis that Ahhiyawa = Mycenaean is accepted.
The Mycenaean colonies on the Anatolian mainland were nearest the coast in the 
south west. Musgebi, near ancient Halikarnassos (Bodrum) is one, Miletos, on the coast, is 
another. At both sites, Mycenaean pottery and burial practices were used. This was a kingdom 
with many people, overseas trade, a naval force and a king respected as a Great King on a par 
with the King of the Hittites (Simpson, 2003; Mountjoy, 1998; Rose, 2008).
However, regarding the fortunes of the Ahhiyawa, the so-called “Milawata letter” is 
of importance. By the time Tudhaliya IV became king (he reigned 1227-1209) the Ahhiyawa 
had a position of authority over the ruler of Milawata. The “Milawata letter” is not entirely 
understood, since it refers to other documents which have not yet been recovered. However, 
the understanding is that Milawata, formerly leaning toward Ahhiyawa interests to the 
disadvantage of the Hittites, had been forced to declare loyalty to the Hittites by king 
Tudhaliya. The letter makes it clear that the Hittites had authority over Milawata. In addition, 
Milawata is also granted a larger degree of freedom, as well as a degree of power over a 
neighbouring Hittite vassal state. This was most unusual, since all vassal states reported 
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directly to Hattusa, not to other states (Bryce, 1998; Rose, 2008).
This was extremely important because it created huge problems for the Ahhiyawa in 
west Anatolia. Their trade and political activities were probably significantly reduced, if not 
wiped out. The King of Ahhiyawa would have lost his most powerful base on the Anatolian 
mainland because the activities of Ahhiyawa were detrimental to Hittite policies in the west. 
Tudhaliya also drew up a treaty with Sausgamuwa, ruler of the Syrian state of Amurru, that 
there should be no Ahhiyawa traffic to Assyria, through ports in Amurru (Hytta was currently 
at war with Assyria). Since Amurru is on the coast, from the south border of the Hittite 
kingdom near Ugarit, down to some point south of Beirut, it was an effective way to cripple 
Ahhiyawa commercial and political activity because they were basically shut out of affairs in 
that end of the Mediterranean. 
 This had a rebound effect on the Hittites, because the Ahhiyawa had had a stabilising 
effect on the local population, and the Hittites had a similar effect on their vassal states in the 
west, so the general effect was a reasonable stability most of the time. When the troubles 
began it was possibly the Ahhiyawa that were affected first. When the crisis had worsened 
sufficiently, it also brought down the Hittites. So had the two cooperated, maybe the course of 
the collapse would have been affected, so that one or both might not have been drowned in 
the ensuing chaos.
As it was, the developments seem to have been increased unrest in the outer vassal 
states of Anatolia, termination of Ahhiyawa control in the west as well as possible unrest in 
some of the states along the trading routes to the south east. Many of the people in the vassal 
states of Anatolia were either displaced or without means to maintain their families or 
themselves, so their only alternative was to migrate. The Hittites had also practised the 
method of moving people en masse for various reasons (e.g. to solve problems of unrest in an 
area, they moved people to another state), so that they had to travel to return to their original 
homes. People were probably travelling in different directions, but the main direction on the 
whole seems to have been southwards (Bryce, 1998).
Another thing that is relevant for the matter of the decline of the Ahhiyawa is the  
draft of a letter found on one or more clay tablets, in which the king of Ahhiyawa was 
included, then in retrospect removed, as a Great King on par with the Hittite king. This 
indicates a reversal of fortunes for Ahhiyawa, for the status of Great King is not just removed 
because one is somewhat piqued with the blighter. Seen in conjunction with the changes at 
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Milawata, it seems highly possible that the Ahhiyawa was already declining at that time, and 
no longer could their king be considered a Great King.
2.5  The Sea Peoples
The Sea Peoples were not a homogeneous society or culture, but a loose number of various 
groups, including more radicalised, disparate or aggressive elements of some societies. They 
operated together from time to time, but at other times not. For many of these people it was a 
matter of fleeing or migrating from their homelands after extreme social disturbances (Voskos 
and Knapp, 2008:659; Bryce, 1998). These people were probably not active in metallurgical 
production for commercial purposes, but it is possible that they included people with a 
metallurgical knowledge. Their activities might have been symptomatic of the state of affairs, 
but they could also have been a part of the problems that put pressure on the elites' control of 
various cultures in the region (Muhly, 1984; Sandars, 1978; Wainwright, 1939, 1961).
There had long been various maritime raids and attacks on the coast of Egypt, Cyprus 
and other parts of the region. Well known are the attacks on Egypt from Libya, but other 
agents were also active in that respect. For some other groups there was a strategy to attack 
and colonise or pillage parts of the fertile Egyptian delta, as well as various polity. These 
people, some from Libya but possibly also from such widespread places as Anatolia, the 
Levant, Greece, Sardinia, Sicily and others, were in several cases known to Ramesses III as 
pirates with a history of making attacks on the east Mediterranean coast.
These known groups included the Peleset (the Philistines, who later settled in 
Palestine), Sherden, Shekelesh, Tjekker, Lukka (from south west Anatolia), the Ekwesh (also 
known as Akaiwasha or Ahhiyawa), Denyen (Danuna, associated with Cilicia) and others. 
Some of these groups later settled in various parts of the region. However, the name “Sea 
Peoples” is taken from the Pharaoh's description of them.
On the walls of the funerary monument to the Pharaoh Ramesses III at Medinet 
Habu, is depicted:  “the foreign countries made a conspiracy in their islands”, and described 
the Sea People's frontal attack that had apparently devastated many of the cultures and lands 
they traversed on the way toward Egypt, including the Hittites and the polity of Ugarit. They 
had wrought havoc everywhere until they reached Egypt, where the Pharaoh stopped them. 
This inscription contributed also to support the theory that the Hittite Empire collapsed and 
was swept away in the Sea People's attacks. There was then mass migration southwards 
16
through Anatolia, the Levant and parts of Palestine as well as inland through Syria, to more 
southerly regions, both inland and along the coast towards Egypt (Muhly, 1984; Sandars, 
1978; Wainwright, 1939, 1961).
There are 2 main sources of information on these attacks against Egypt. One was the 
script at  Medinet Habu, but the other was the Great Harris Papyrus of Ramesses IV, son of 
Ramesses III.  This scroll is over 1500 lines long and describes the whole of Ramesses III's 
reign. Both of these are written with some political acumen designed to portray the Pharaoh 
as a formidable personage, well able to deflect the attacks of the pirates and maintain 
domestic security. They may have been angled in such a way as to maximise the external 
threat, as well as the defence and potency of the Pharaoh. In other words the attacks may 
have been more coincidental, uncoordinated, limited and sporadic, with smaller groups than 
is portrayed in the scripts. Nevertheless it is apparent that the Pharaoh stopped the land side 
advances of the migrant peoples and then sank the raiders' ships, thereby securing the 
Egyptian domains intact (Bryce, 1998: 370).
The reliefs and inscriptions on the mortuary temple of Ramesses III at Medinet Habu 
are part of a long history of such monuments to Egyptian Pharaohs, where the principal part 
is the Pharaoh and his view is paramount. Since the venture turned out well for the Pharaoh, 
the number of the enemy could easily be vastly overstated, thereby showing that the Pharaoh 
had done his job heroically and repulsed a very threatening invader (Roberts, 2009).
But the question of the origin of these people is not satisfactorily answered in any of 
the sources mentioned, so from which islands did the Sea Peoples come? Here there may be a 
translation problem, for Bryce (1998:367, see footnote) states that there is no equivalent word 
in Egyptian script for “islands”. There is however, a word for “lands bordering the sea”, 
which might be called “sealands” or simply coastal regions, or perhaps even “littoral”. So the 
Sea Peoples were simply groups of people who were to be found near the sea or travelling on 
it. But they also included migrating populations from various parts of Anatolia whose mode 
of transport was probably the most frequently used mode of the period, boats, but many of 
whom also moved inland (Bryce, 1998: 367-368).
These groups were in part people who had been cast on hard times following the 
collapse of Hittite domains in central Anatolia, and Ahhiyawa domains in west Anatolia (both 
of which had offered security and stability). This became a movement of people seeking 
southwards for new lands and new opportunities. Bryce (1998) rejects the notion of barbaric 
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northerners moving down from parts of Europe and probably Caucasus, driving people in 
front of them. 
However, these people could certainly not have formed a military operation in any 
ordered manner against the remaining states in the region, especially Egypt. Bryce thinks this 
movement could have been combined with an opportunistic raiding and pillaging, but they 
could not have threatened the military power of Egypt. They could possibly have had trouble 
obtaining food and shelter, and thus caused problems. Other participants must have been the 
traditional raiders of the region, such as the Lukka (who the Pharaoh Akhenaten had 
complained of in the 14th century) and perhaps Libyans, making the most of their 
opportunity. They were also looking for places they could take control of, and they had 
military strength. Bryce (1998:367-373) 
The “Sea Peoples” were in large part a consequence of the collapses in the states of 
Ahhiyawa as well as Anatolia, and the Ahhiyawa had naval power. Once the Mycenaeans lost 
their former hold on power, and the Great King was reduced to ordinary king near Corinth, 
the various islands and communities of the Greek mainland as well as those in west Anatolia 
would have to find new ways to maintain themselves. It's not a far cry to imagine Ahhiyawa 
ships taking part in operations planned by Libyans or others, against cities in the region or 
even Egypt, in their new and poorer circumstances.
2.6  Cyprus
Cyprus was little involved in international affairs in the eastern Mediterranean until just 
before the LBA. In fact the island was initially mostly isolated until the migration of people, 
especially from Anatolia, occurred in the prehistoric BA. By about 1700 BC the island was in 
the process of establishing contacts and trading with other parts of the region. Part of this 
activity was based on the ongoing and increasing exploitation of mineral resources around the 
foothills of the Troudos mountains. Copper was the most important resource that was 
extracted. This helped feed the demand in many parts of the region for copper, and later for 
bronze (Steel, 2004:149-160). In the period 14th – 13th centuries BC, the commercial and 
cultural affairs came under the control of elites, with one king (Steel, 2004:149:160; 
Manning, 1998:54; Knapp, 1996:22-23). Muhly (1989) however, states that Cyprus retained a 
regional structure with each region having a local ruler. This structure prevented a total 
economic failure in Cyprus at the end of the LBA, and Cyprus was well placed to move into 
the new economic structures in the early IA.
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Cyprus' role in the region appears also to have been important in LBA, being  a 
major supplier of copper, other raw materials and products of copper and bronze. Most of the 
exchange concerning copper was done with “ox-hide” shaped ingots (Muhly, 1977), which 
often weighed about 30-40 kg each. This continued after the collapse, although its own 
economy suffered, albeit to a lesser extent than most cultures in the region. Migrations and 
invasions also had an impact. Steel (2004:150-155) in discussing Cyprus states that there is 
evidence of population resettlement from inland to coastal regions, building of forts inland, 
destruction horizons, and mass burials. The inland fortifications could indicate internal 
unrest, since they are situated on routes across the island, indicating internal instability.
Possibly the changes in settlement patterns and destruction horizons indicate the 
same. It seems likely that movement of populations may have taken place, probably with 
some conflicts. It does seem probable that Cyprus would have been affected by events in the 
region, because of its position as well as any affiliations (figure 1). The situation seems to 
bear witness to the sort of social unrest that accompanies migration from external places, as 
well as internal. The relocation movements from internal settlements to coastal areas could, in 
LBA, also be a consequence of the booming bronze industry, with establishment of more 
industrial sites along the coastal region Steel (2004).
Cyprus played a central role in metallurgy in the Mediterranean, and produced and 
exported bronze artefacts well into the iron age. So it seems that bronze was still available in 
Cyprus. There are also indications of some type of "blockade" which prevented east-west 
trade after the LBA collapse, whereby sufficient amounts of copper and tin might have been 
prevented from delivery in several parts of the region Zaccagnini (1990). This is supported 
indirectly by Meyer (2008:58-61) who proposes that bronze age societies are very vulnerable 
to disturbances in their commercial region, based on his analysis of the failed Sumerian 
culture.
At this point it might be well to remember the ancient trade routes to Mesopotamia 
and its environs, from which civilisations the Hittites and Assyrian Traders acquired tin. This 
seems likely to have still been possible after the collapse, and even if there were maritime 
blockades to Cyprus' western seas. It's not far eastwards from Cyprus to the Levantine coastal 
ports, and caravans from there to Mesopotamia might still have been operating (McConchie, 
2004:16-17). At any rate, from Waldbaum (1978:36) we see that the finds of metals from 
Cyprus indicate a more affluent society than many others after the collapse. Especially gold 
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which is at constant high levels throughout the transition 1200 – 900 BC.
A further element introduced into the discussion is that the development of iron 
production might have become so advanced that people willingly adopted iron technology, 
and that there was a very rapid change from LBA to IA (Zaccagnini, 1990). There is also 
clear evidence that there was ample opportunity for the LBA metallurgy craftsmen to 
experiment at their leisure with high iron content copper, for example those who produced the 
copper that was on board the Cape Gelidonya shipwreck (Snodgrass, 1980:340). In Cyprus 
the bronze industry remained conservative until there was a strong wave of newcomers into 
Cyprus about 1200 BC.
At this point metallurgists started experimenting intensively with iron, culminating 
in a full Iron Age before the end of LCIIIB (about 1050 BC). One of several finds of LBA 
iron knives from excavations on Cyprus, excavated from Room 19 LCIIIB context at Enkomi 
by P. Dikaos, was shown to be carbonized, quench-hardened and tempered, on examination 
by the metallurgist E. Tholander. It had the qualities of a modern high-carbon steel. There is 
no evidence of similar developments anywhere else in the region until some time later 
(Snodgrass, 1980:341). This means that Cyprus was poised to lead the region on entry to the 
Iron Age. At this point, it should be said, as Doonan (1994:84) does so eloquently 
“.....technology, which is seen not as an external phenomenon to society but as a total social 
phenomenon wholly embedded within society”.
Cyprus probably experienced a movement of people to the island in the 12th -11th 
centuries BC. Mycenaean immigrants to Cyprus arrived in a gradual fashion and probably 
continued with their trades on the island. As discussed later in this thesis, Mycenaeans were 
also (at least partly) otherwise known as the Ahhiyawa, and were a people with maritime 
traditions. This would have strengthened Cyprus in commercial ventures from the island to 
other parts of the Mediterranean. In short the Aegean contribution to development in Cyprus 
was significant in this period of about 200-300 years, before and after the transition from 
LBA to IA (Voskos and Knapp , 2008:678-679). This might well be a key to understanding 
why the Iron Age did get off to a fairly quick start. Cyprus was ready to lead on into the IA, 
and as said before, probably had the resources to do so.
2.7  Trade network in the eastern Mediterranean
The city of Ugarit was an important node in the traffic of the region, since it was a port for 
maritime trade as well as centrally placed for land based trade to Hytta, Syria and other 
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inland destinations. Most of the inland goods transport was done by caravan. These trade 
routes existed between Ugarit and Egypt, Hittite Asia Minor, parts of the southern Euphrates 
region, Kadesh in Syria, and Babylonia . Ugarit was also forced to pay tribute to the Hittite 
king (Helzer, 1977:206-207; Negbi, 2005:18). The maritime routes were of course by sea, but 
the distance to Cyprus was short.
There is evidence of contact between Cyprus and other parts of the region. For 
example the similarity in town planning layout and architecture between Ugarit and Enkomi 
(Cyprus) in the period LC IIC, where ashlar masonry was used for similar purposes (Negbi, 
2005:7). That this is so is hardly surprising since both Enkomi and Ugarit are ports, about 200 
km apart, and Cyprus supplied large amounts of copper to the region. A huge amount of metal 
trading was through the port of Ugarit (Heltzer, 1977).
There are 2 shipwrecks of special interest in the Mediterranean. Both are near the cape 
at the south west part of Turkey, south of Kaş. The one at Ulu Burun went down at the end of 
the 14th century BC (Bass, 1986; Pulak, 1988; Bass et al, 1989; Pulak, 1998), and the one at 
Cape Gelidonya went down end of 13th century BC (Bass et al 1967; Muhly et al, 1977). The 
Ulu Burun wreck was a “rich” find with several metals including massive amounts of copper, 
and lead and silver. The Cape Gelidonya wreck was more a cargo of metal scrap and various 
metal smithing equipment, suitable for a travelling bronze smith (Sherratt, 2000:83-88). The 
Ulu Burun wreck correlates with LBA expansion up to 1300 BC, based on the value of the 
cargo, and that was a period of strong economic growth. 
The ship wrecks off Cape Gelidonya and Ulu Burun demonstrate that trade was 
extensive (Pulak, 1998; Bass, 1986), and one of the ships was thought to have Cyprus as its 
last cargo port. These wrecks confirm such maritime traffic at least in the last phase of LBA, 
but the possibility must also have been present in the earlier LBA. In addition, the Ulu Burun 
shipwreck was a trader of the times and carried organic cargoes for off-loading in other ports 
or their hinterlands (Haldane, 1993). This supports the view that ships such as that at Ulu 
Burun were normal modes of transport in the eastern Mediterranean, between Egypt, the 
Levant, Anatolia as well as more westerly destinations.
The wreck at Cape Gelidonya
The ship was a 9-10 metres long merchant vessel, sailing toward Cape Gelidonya from its 
last port of call in Cyprus, and had a large cargo embarked. The ship was likely to have been 
hired or owned by a metal smith (there was only one personal seal on board), and had ingots 
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of copper (ox-hide), tin and bronze, as well as scrap metals, various stones used in metallurgy 
as anvils, a weight system for commercial use etc. and diverse other objects typically used in 
metallurgic operations. The ship probably sank about 1200 BC in about 30 metres of water. It 
is believed that the merchant was Syrian and the ship sailed originally from a Syro-
Palestinian port. Pictures of the ingots show that they all are slightly dissimilar in shape, 
showing that they were not part of any “industrialised” technological production process, but 
produced in the standard fashion and each looked distinct (Bass et al, 1967).
However, Muhly et al (1977) dispute the home port of the ship, and the port of lading 
of the ingots, posing that it is not possible to ascertain these details from the contents of the 
wreck. But one interesting position by Muhly et al is that some of the Bronze Age trade must 
have been in the hands of private entrepreneurs. This strengthens the line of reasoning that 
the elites did not control the entire trading system in about 1200 BC. Looking at the details of 
the ingots, Muhly et al point out that some ingots distributed by centralised organisations 
could have been sold to private commercial agents for shipping and sale internationally at 
some time probably before 1200 BC.
The wreck at Ulu Burun
This ship carried a rich cargo and was seemingly plying the same route as the Cape 
Gelidonya wreck. The waters in this area must be treacherous, because there are reports of 
oh-hide ingots either being recovered, or identified by sponge divers, who can descend to 
fairly deep coastal water (Bass, 1986). This wreck differs from the Cape Gelidonya wreck in 
a number of ways, especially in the composition of the cargo. The artefacts present on the 
Gelidonya were indicative of an entrepreneur metal-smith, plying ports along the coast and 
looking for goods and markets, whereas the cargo on the Ulu Burun carried major resources 
and also luxury items. This shipment may well be direct evidence for international elite gift 
exchange. The types included copper ox-hide ingots and tin in the same form (Pulak, 1988).
Pottery of Syrian, Mycenaean, Cypriot and Canaanite types were included in the 
cargo, and indicate that trade between the various parts of the eastern Mediterranean was 
extensive. The cargo also included bronze tools and weapons, weights, gold and silver 
jewellery, a gold ring inscribed with Egyptian hieroglyphs and much more (Pulak, 1988). 
There was also a gold scarab of Nefertiti, who may have been co-regent in Egypt in the reign 
of Akhenaten. This is a most important find, of Egyptian origin, ever made in the eastern 
Mediterranean. There was  also more of the luxury items of gold previously mentioned as 
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well as tools, and more seals (Bass et al, 1989). This wreck had an extraordinarily rich cargo.
The Ulu Burun ship contained 354 ox-hide ingots (often with a weight of about 30-
40 kg). In addition, there were about 130 other ingots, about 150 Canaanite jars with wine, at 
about 25 litres each (Pulak, 1998). This cargo could in total could have been in excess of 
about 30 tons, and a 10 meter sailing vessel (beam to length ratio 1:3). This seems to be quite 
heavy, almost unmanageable. So it could be that the risks are high, but the chances of extra 
earnings are also high, by taking on extra cargo. Perhaps the chances of earning really big 
amounts were enough to encourage some captains to go in for private commercialism in 
goods transport by ship in the LBA. Apparently, this did not always go well. 
2.8  Summary – cultures and societies
The foregoing sections have treated the societies in the eastern Mediterranean in LBA, up to 
the PRC. This is necessary because the development of iron at that time was very dependant 
on social conditions and changes in them, as well as developments in metallurgy. It is clear 
that Anatolia, especially the Hittite Realm, was the centre of iron technological development 
at its earliest time in the eastern Mediterranean region. The societies in Anatolia had good 
connections with Mesopotamia, Babylon and neighbouring parts, and possibly gained their 
knowledge of iron metallurgy from those regions. Even if this was not the case, their own 
insight was probably enforced by comparison with developments there.
The Hittites were also the first society to succumb to the PRC. The Hittites' ruling 
dynasty were from one family, and there was considerable trouble within that family. There 
were several occasions when that ruling dynasty looked as though it could fall, because of 
internal disagreement. That it did fall in the end should be no surprise, but that it should have 
vanished completely practically overnight is somewhat surprising. There is no information to 
be gleaned on the last days of the Hittite Realm, even though the Neo Hittite kingdom in 
Carchemish claimed to be descended from the Hittite realm, with direct line of descent from 
the Hittite Great King. Even if they knew what had happened, they certainly weren't telling 
(Bryce, 2012: 9-32; 1998). Neither did they make a significant profile in the sphere of iron 
technology and development. So where did this insight go? Who, after the fall of the Hittite 
dynasty, possessed the necessary knowledge of the extraction and production of from ores?
For Cyprus there was a slow start to their activities, being isolated until ~1800 BC, 
and then slowly supplying more and more copper (for making bronze) and getting into a 
position of almost impervious stability. It is possible that the powerful societies around might 
23
have preferred a neutral Cyprus, since it was such an important provider to all. Or maybe the 
Hittites who were the nearest, powerful, and likely to think themselves feudal masters of 
Cyprus, deterred potential invaders from trying to conquer it. The Hittites had no navy, and 
Cyprus is pretty big, so that it wouldn't be worth the effort for them to rule it themselves. 
With regard to iron, any other development politically on Cyprus might well have delayed the 
IA by a very long time.
The other societies, the Ahhiyawa and the mixed group the “Sea Peoples” all 
contributed to the developments of iron at that period, contributing knowledge, cultures, 
communication, colonies and political change, all necessary for the development of iron 
technology..
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3 Aspects of metallurgy and production in parts of the region
Metallurgy is the use of knowledge, experience and practice for mining, processing and 
forming metals. It is also the creative process of shaping metal objects into tools or other 
objects that can be effectively used by humans, and which make their traditional work easier 
and more effective, in relation to wood and stone based tools. In addition, new tools can 
probably make possible new methods of doing work, including tasks not previously 
undertaken. The transition from LBA to early IA happened in the project’s focus period, and 
metallurgy is a major interest to this project. The transition process was an effect of the 
increase in use of iron in relation to bronze, until iron reached the third stage described by 
Snodgrass in section 1.3. So in this section metallurgy will be discusses with emphasis on the 
processes involved, both for copper and iron. The alloying of copper and tin to produce 
bronze is also mentioned.
For the Aegean, metallurgy is not present in the archaeological record before ca. 
5500 BC. But there was some connection with the Balkans, which demonstrates a wide 
spread of early metallurgy (Muhly, 2006:156-160). Muhly also states that developments in 
the Balkans was on a larger scale and some centuries earlier than similar developments in the 
Aegean. In Crete, there was a later start to metallurgy. Finds there were from in the area from 
Mesara and Phaistos in the west to Palaikastro in the east. This is more than half the area of 
Crete, and included settlements in the Final Neolithic, ca. 4500 to 3500 BC (Muhly, 2006: 
155-156).
3.1  Production of copper and bronze  
Bronze is an alloy made principally of copper and tin (although other types were also used by 
the ancients, e.g. arsenic bronze). Ancient artefacts often contain amounts of other 
constituents also, all of which can affect the qualities of the bronze. This metal alloy was 
important for human development. It was used by the ancients for making tools, armaments, 
equipment of all sorts and jewellery (Waldbaum, 1978).
Production of bronze is in principle a fairly simple process to understand, but it does 
require a high level of organisation to keep the production system as a whole continuously 
operational, and  especially with maintenance of the market. See for example the Amarna 
letters (Moran, 1992), which also refer to Egypt's acquisition of bronze (Knapp et al, 
1994:427, among others). It is also probable that it required a long period of development, 
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since the process involves one or more chemical reactions , a pyrotechnical proficiency, a 
very large and consistent supply of energy and significant competency in mining metal ores 
(Tylecote, 1980). It could hardly be seen as an intuitive development process. Given that 
people did in fact produce a reasonably consistent production of fairly good to high quality 
bronze alloy, after perhaps hundreds of years of development, and continued to do so, means 
that they were metallurgically competent. They were probably also familiar with 
development aspects, using alternative production methods and learning how to adapt 
methods from the resulting products.
To investigate the metallurgical processes involved in producing iron, we have to 
start by looking at the forgoing metallurgical practices and traditions in bronze production, 
because they were the precursors. After the copper ores have been mined and the wood has 
been converted to charcoal, the ores have to be crushed to a suitable size for the furnace. The 
furnace (figure 2) was purpose-built, of stones and/or clay, and is equipped with an air supply 
by manual pumping of air through some form of bellows. The air is led straight to the heart of 
the furnace through one or more tuyères which are attached to the bellows with a hose or 
pipe. The combination of ores, pumped air and charcoal yielding temperatures over 1200 
degrees C (energy) leads to reduction of the ores and the formation of relatively high grade 
copper in the furnace, which then moves down by gravity to the furnace bottom. The slag, a 
non-usable bi-product of the reaction, also forms at a higher point and moves down, but 
"floats" on top of the liquid copper, which has a melting point of 1083 degrees C (Hough, 
1916)). There are tapping holes at the suitable levels to drain off slag and copper as separate 
products (Tylecote, 1980).
The reactions which take place in these conditions vary somewhat. The central 
principle is the reduction of ores containing a high percentage of copper (but also other 
substances, some including iron) to copper of greater purity and other products. This is 
expressed very generally by: CuO + CO → Cu + CO2, but is much more complex (see later in 
text). As said already, other substances such as silica are present, and these run off as slag 
(and other gases in addition to CO2). These other substances vary with the method selected 
for producing the copper. Some substances are part of the ore itself, but others were in fact 
added as "fluxes", to aid in the copper extraction process. It is also probable that the 
metallurgists of the ancient world often smelted the copper in 2 or more "runs". This would 
have depended on factors such as available ores and fuels, human and natural resources and 
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locality dependant characteristics (Charles, 1980; Tylecote, 1980; Doonan 1994).
Some of the processes (e.g. roasting plus smelting) require a minimum of 2 separate  
operations. Some produced heavy sulphuric fumes, and would have been significantly 
polluting. This could have been best to have done near the mine, and not near the settlement. 
Transportation was also a factor, requiring a train of donkeys or asses to move the product to 
the "end user", the harbour for shipping, or the next processing. It might also have been 
advantageous to do the first smelt near the mine, to reduce the amount of material that needed 
to be transported to the final processing plant, i.e. leave the slag on site. The product could 
have been  a partially processed low grade copper, a high grade copper, a bronze ingot or a 
final product, e.g. bronze tools, armaments, equipment or jewellery.
Pre-processing of ores is also an important step in effective use of resources. From 
the viewpoint of the BA metallurgist, and taking account of the methods and choices they had 
then, the procedure is as follows. The ore which has been mined goes firstly through a 
process of beneficiation. There are several choices in this process, and it leads to a more 
effective smelt in later stages. The ore is first crushed, then ore-rich nodules selected and 
gangue discarded (saving time and energy later). This is a manual task, making use of colour 
and density. Other methods, such as winnowing (throwing upwards and into the wind), 
panning and sluicing with water can also have been used. The total mass of extracted, mined 
material can be reduced while higher grade ore can be retained (Doonan, 1994:85-87).
The next step is crushing lumps of chalcopyrite. The best method is using a “pebble 
hammer”, or a normal stone pebble from e.g. a pebble beach. This in hand, the ore is placed 
on a large stone, on the ground, and crushed with blows from the hand held pebble. This is a 
better method than the use of a lump hammer because of lower impact velocity and larger 
surface for striking the ore. In trial, this process produced more crushed ore per unit time than 
use of a lump hammer.
After crushing, the sulphidic copper ore can be roasted. There are a number of ways 
to do this and there are many equations to suit them. In the main, there is a dead roast or a 
partial roast. A dead roast means that all sulphur is driven off and a partial roast means that 
some sulphur is driven off. An example of each chemical equation is shown below (more 
reactions and equations exist). Note that the partial roast does not remove all sulphur:
4CuFeS2 + 13O2 → 4CuO + 2Fe2O3 + 8SO2 Dead roast
4CuFeS2 +   7O2 → 4CuS  + 2Fe2O3 + 4SO2 Partial roast (remaining copper sulphide)
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From the above equations, we can see that there is parity in numbers of copper and 
iron atoms. The copper melts first, and forms a matte, which needs a secondary processing to 
obtain pure copper. In general partial roasts seem to have been slightly more popular. The 
roasting can be done by arranging baulks of wood in a pit, under and between the copper ore, 
and then the wood is fired. Once the wood has burnt out, the ore is collected. The process 
generates a lot of greasy smoke and sulphurous gasses, so that the area around the site is 
affected (Doonan, 1994:88-96) This would have been an environmental factor in BA.
It is clear from Doonan's experiments that there is considerable expertise involved in 
choice of materials, wood stacking and management, and a host of other considerations. 
Nevertheless, this gives a realistic impression of what the BA metallurgists were doing to 
produce copper (Doonan, 1994).
The industrial pollution component of the entire project must have had considerable 
impact on the area. Clearing forests, burning wood for charcoal, smelting, roasting and co-
smelting producing in all probability vast quantities of smoke and pollution. It brings to mind 
descriptions of the “dark satanic mills” first mentioned in poems by William Blake (1808), 
later put to music by Sir Hubert Parry (1916), which did conceptually depict grimmer times 
and heavy pollution in early industrial England.
3.2  The structure and function of BA Furnaces
As part of this project the author took part in an experimental smelting of copper, under the 
auspices of the Archaeological Research Unit of the University of Cyprus in Nicosia. The 
experimental work was done at the mine of Skouriotissa, Cyprus. This experiment was to 
explore just one smelting process for copper. There was no co-smelting or roasting, just the 
central process of extracting copper in an open furnace of the simplest type, and a slightly 
bigger one. This was extremely useful, because it effectively showed to the participants that 
this was a simple process that could quite believably have been used by the ancients.
The general procedure is as follows: The ore is crushed manually and placed in the 
clay “heat resistant” crucible. The crucible is placed in the open furnace, and charcoal heaped 
over it. The charcoal is then ignited, and the bellows are pumped assiduously. This can be 
exhausting work, so the “bellowers” change over as necessary. 
Once the temperature rises to near 1200 C the copper smelts and trickles down into 
the crucible, along with the slag. The slag floats on top of the copper in the crucible, and is a 
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bi-product not collected under normal circumstances. In theory the copper then is collected 
from the crucible and can go on to the next stage of the process, re-smelting or whatever is 
necessary. There are 2 basic types of furnace, the bowl (open) furnace (figure 2) and the shaft 
furnace (figure 3).
The practical problems seen during the experiment were:
1. There must be enough ore and it should be crushed (as described above). It's not 
necessary to produce a fine powder to get a result, but that's more effective.
2. Reaching the required temperature of about 1200 C should be done rapidly. This 
requires assiduous bellowing, and not least, enough charcoal. Better results are 
obtained with several sets of bellows. For this experiment, less than 50 % success 
might possibly have been a result of less than optimum bellowing (usually 2 bellows 
and only 1 bellower, or person operating them).
3. The emphasis should be on covering the crucible amply with charcoal, and then some. 
Having to add charcoal can cause delays and cooling, which causes problems. In 
addition, part of the chemical reaction is the addition of carbon, so there should be 
only charcoal, lots of it, and heaped in contact with the ore! 
4. The “heat resistant” crucible (figure 4) melts at a temperature slightly above that of 
copper. The distribution of heat in such open furnaces is affected by wind, bellowing, 
and other events caused by the operators and weather. In some circumstances the 
crucible can melt, and the smelted copper (matte) “sinks into” the mass of the crucible 
and slag lies on top, and appears to mix somewhat with the upper half of the crucible.
One of the important things that early metallurgists became aware of was the 
procedure of “fluxing”, whereby other metal ores could be added to the smelt in order to 
extract more copper than would otherwise be possible, and sometimes faster (using less fuel).
3.3  Other types of furnace
We know that early cultures made ceramic artefacts by firing clay. These must have been 
fired in early furnaces, which are unsuitable for smelting of metals. Some reasons could have 
been a lack of reductive charcoal in contact with the ore in such furnaces, and the problem 
with furnaces that were big enough to fire ceramics, of achieving high enough temperatures 
to smelt metals. As seen in the previous section, a reducing furnace for some metals is at its 
simplest, quite small, in need of heavy blowing (bellowing), although easy to build (even if 
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you have to destroy it after each use). Chalcolithic period furnaces could tackle the 
complexity of producing copper from various substrates containing iron, lead, arsenic and a 
multitude of other elements as well as copper (Tylecote, 1980:183-188). A point to note here 
is that metallurgists from even the earliest times must have been accustomed to dealing with 
complexes of iron, among others.
The majority of known LBA furnaces were found in places in Israel, possibly 
because research projects have been more frequent and investigative there. These can be 
described as embedded in the ground, with a sloping slag pit and mortared or cemented sides. 
The slag weighed about 30 kg and the ingots calculated to be about 2-4 kg. The bottom of the 
furnace was formed as a small pit, or bowl, and when the process was at the right stage, the 
slag was tapped off, leaving the copper in the bottom pit. This process, however, does not 
lead to the best known ingot of LBA, which are the so-called ox-hide ingots. These are 
named for their shape, reminiscent of the hides of oxen (Tylecote, 1980:190-192).  Such 
ingots as these have been found in ship wrecks such as that at Ulu Burun (Pulak, 1988), in 
some Egyptian tombs (as images painted in scenes), and in some excavation sites.
Ox-hide ingots weigh a good deal more, and probably need 4 furnaces producing 
(or most probably re-smelting) copper at the same time. They often weigh a little more than 
30 kg, so each furnace would have to produce at least twice as much as described above. This 
would be difficult, according to Tylecote (1980), without a substantial improvement in 
furnace construction. Furnaces became a little more developed later in LBA . Ox-hide ingots 
were traded widely in the eastern Mediterranean, and images of them have been found in 
Egyptian tombs ca 1450 BC (Tylecote, 1980:194). These ingots can probably be made by 
using some smaller ingots in a secondary remelting operation. It is possible that many ox-
hide ingots were cast this way.
The normal design for an LBA ingot type furnace is a furnace wall, either circular 
or rectangular in plan, and made of clay or brick. It is sunk into the ground far enough for the 
surface of the slag (which floats on the smelted metal) to be slightly below ground level. The 
tuyeres (air tubes for blowing air into the charcoal in the furnace) go through the wall just 
above ground level. The bellows are not part of the furnace, but are also required. Under the 
clay/brick furnace wall there is a clay foundation with an inner rounded bottom (a bowl, not 
quite hemispheric in section) to collect the metal. There are 2 tap holes, the high one in the 
lower wall (for slag) and low one in the foundation bottom (for copper). The upper tap hole 
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leads to the slag pit and the lower to the mould in the casting pit (from the diagram in 
Tylecote, 1980:195). In building a furnace to this design the intention is probably to use it 
more than once. 
The brazier type furnace is somewhat similar to the ingot type, but does not tap slag 
or metal, because it doesn't smelt the ore. These were probably used to melt scraps of metal 
and pour them into a mould. There are no tuyeres, and the temperature probably didn't go far 
over temperatures of 950 C, which is sufficient to melt bronze. The furnace stands on the 
ground with openings under and through the walls so air can be drawn into the furnace, 
through a grating of clay, and up through the charcoal or wood. The metal is in the crucible, 
where it is melted. A hole in the wall is used to access the crucible. This type of furnace is 
probably reusable. Only the crucibles are at risk in normal circumstances. The earliest 
example of this type is from Abu Matar near Beersheba, 3300 – 3000 BC, (Tylecote, 
1980:197). 
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4  Iron: what is it and what potential had it in the ancient world?
Iron is a metal, and an abundant element in the Universe, as well as on Earth. The earliest 
iron artefacts (from the 4th millennia BC) were very often of meteoric origin (i.e. matter from 
the collision of a meteor with the Earth), highly regarded, and more commonly associated 
with sovereignty and power. One example of how this aspect has survived to modern times is 
a gift by a foreign emissary to Queen Elizabeth II of England, of a sword of meteoric iron.
4.1  The Entrance of Iron
Meteoric iron is in principle found where meteorites that survive the passage through the 
atmosphere have struck down on the earth's surface. The main characteristic of meteoric iron 
is its content of nickel. We know that meteoric iron contains more nickel than does terrestrial 
iron, and that makes the iron a better quality (Waldbaum, 1980).
The scarcity of meteoric iron and sometimes its superior qualities would have made 
it more attractive as a "collector's item". This state of affairs was probably continued until 
bronze smelting craftsmen recognised the presence of terrestrial iron in their ores, slags and 
matte, and began to experiment with that metal for further processing. Their most immediate 
problem would have been to process the metal complex to a more pure state (van der Merwe 
& Avery, 1982). This was not done early, but their achievements in some cases later on were 
exceptional, and the quality of their iron close to that of modern times. Iron technology was 
improved in the LBA but production of really high grade iron (steel) had to wait until much 
later (Wheeler and Maddin, 1980).
The discovery of iron was the inevitable end product of technological development 
in BA. That there were developments in pyrotechnology throughout thousands of years, 
developments in construction of metallurgic furnaces and exclusive use of charcoal in contact 
with metals, and of course the penetration of previously unused zones of gossan in search for 
new metallurgical ores, all led the ancients to a final discovery of iron's potential. Just as 
impressive is the revelation that it about 4,000 BP there was a centre in northern Anatolia of 
culture, metals and trade that introduced the concepts of banking and credit and their practice 
(Wertime & Muhly, 1980:xiii-xv; Bryce, 1998:26-29).
There was a connection between cultural development and development of iron 
technology. Some cultures, e.g. the New World, chose not to pursue that path, but e.g. Asia 
and the Near East chose did do so (Wertime & Muhly, 1980:xv-xix). It is from this work also 
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evident that iron's technological development was linked to the work done with production of 
terracotta, glass and cement. This was also done in BA (Wertime & Muhly, 1980:1-11). 
4.2  Early iron finds
4000 BC: Various small objects and utensils for daily use were found in grave contexts from 
4000 BC, in Egypt. Some examples are iron beads, a plate, picks and a dagger, all from Egypt 
and dated about 4000, 2800 and 2200 BC respectively(Richardson, 1934:555). But there do 
not seem to be very many other artefacts of iron from this early period. Could there have been 
more, that have since simply rusted away? It is however, thought that terrestrial (not 
meteoric) iron was being worked in Anatolia in the early bronze age (Waldbaum, 1978;20).
The Assyrian Colonies in Anatolia were established and active early in the second 
millennium BC (Bryce, 1998:21). Iron was known at that time and was regarded as a 
precious metal. It was known in Anatolia in Sumerian text as KU.AN about 2000-1500 BC, 
and as AN.BAR about 1500-1000 BC. In Hittite texts it seems that only AN.BAR is used 
throughout the Hittite Kingdom's existence. KU.AN was traded in Anatolia at more than 8 
parts gold to 1 part iron (Maxwell-Hyslop, 1972). Iron was used in this period in many parts 
of the region at this time. For example in Mesopotamia (Muhly et al, 1985:68) and in 
Anatolia (Yalçın, 1999). 
An other text source mentions iron, stating that there existed 400 iron šukur weapons 
(maybe spearheads) in the 18th century BC, in Hatay (Yalçın, 1999:182). He also states that 
iron at this time was an extremely valuable material, most commonly associated with 
sovereignty and power. Since his source in this case was a text, and it didn't give the origin of 
iron material, we can't know whether it was meteoric iron or not, because we don't have the 
artefacts. The obvious advantage of meteoric iron is that it can be simpler to produce objects 
from it, since part of the work with smelting and smithing is unnecessary (Wadsworth, 1883). 
In a recent excavation at Kaman-Kalehöyük by Japanese researchers, the finds 
included pieces of iron slag, as well as copper sulphide ores. There is reason to believe that 
copper was produced using a copper-iron sulphide mix there. This was dated to the Assyrian 
Colony Period (Akanuma, 2008:a). From the same excavation a sample was collected from 
Stratum IVa, which was, or had been, part of an object of steeled iron. Its carbon content was 
thought to be 0.1 – 0.3 % of mass. The general conclusion, based on the observations on site, 
was that the production of steel had begun there in the 3rd millennium BC. The general 
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conclusions of this project put forward the hypothesis that there had been connections 
between the proto- Hittites and the Assyrians (or other people) from the Mesopotamian 
region, which had led to the development of iron (and steel) in central Anatolia at that time 
(Akanuma, 2008:b).
1400 BC: An important artefact in this respect is the Ugarit battle axe; from about 
1450-1350 BC, with a nickel content of 3.25 % and a carbon content of 0.41 %, which puts it 
in the range of mild steel (Waldbaum, 1978;17). There is some discussion as to whether the 
axe is of meteoric iron, but the point is made that the piece was forged. No further 
conclusions are given, and it seems that this particular discussion on meteoric origin was not 
decided. This artefact shows that the knowledge of methods to produce steeled iron may have 
existed prior to 1200 BC.  
In Anatolia, copper and tin were not easy to acquire, bronze was considered a luxury 
material, but iron ore deposits were readily available and items of everyday use were worked 
in iron. There was development of iron technology in early 2nd millennium BC and the 
Hittites used iron weapons at the battle of Kadesh in 1285 BC (Muhly et al, 1985:68). 
Mention is also made there that in Ugarit iron was considered a precious metal, worth much 
more than copper and twice as much as silver.
1200 BC: Presumably there was a continuous development in those parts and those 
times. The intentional extraction of iron took place in the Hittite domains north of Assyria in 
13th. century BC (Pleiner and Bjorkman, 1974:307-308). 
In the 12th century BC further evidence of iron technology is the find of a primitive 
iron smelting installation in Israel (lower Galilee) dated to the 12th century BC (Liebowitz 
and Folk, 1984:264). Thus had iron as a metal grown from the scarce (and therefore precious) 
little known metal arriving on the earth
4.3  Number and types of artefacts found in the region
From about 1400 BC complex societies of the eastern Mediterranean began to disappear, 
while for the same period, objects of iron appear more frequently in the archaeological record 
(figure 5). Nevertheless, the amount of iron finds is not as extensive as one would like, and 
certainly not as extensive as comparable finds of bronze. This makes all quantitative research 
on iron technological development more difficult (McConchie, 2004:12; Waldbaum, 1978). 
The amount of iron artefacts does not reflect the popularity of iron at that time. Iron 
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is much more likely to corrode and generally deteriorate than other metals that were used 
then (Waldbaum, 1978:57-Fig. Iv.l4 .) Iron which endures soil or moisture will rapidly revert 
to a substance quite similar to iron ore. It will rapidly decompose until it looks like a useless 
unformed piece of ore. Then the way is short to the scrap heap when excavated in later times, 
such as 13th century Timna, where more than 700 iron fragments were excavated, but only 7-
8 were published afterwards (McConchie, 2004:13).
The importance of whether iron is found in burial contexts or some other 
environment is pivotal. Burial contexts have often conditions with less moisture and stable air 
circulation, such that iron objects deposited there have a better chance of retaining their 
condition for some time. Other factors which might affect the quantitative analysis of iron in 
archaeological projects are the geographic coverage of excavations. If excavations are being 
conducted somewhere other than Anatolia (e.g. Cyprus) then the results will not necessarily 
reflect what otherwise might have been deposited in Anatolia (McConchie 2004; Sandars, 
1978:177).
Archaeological reporting might also be flawed for objects which are not easily 
identifiable or perceived as not suitable for publication. There is very often a bias in 
perception of ancient iron's utilitarian value. The basis for this has been a view of the 
technological superiority of hardened and tempered steel over bronze. This also encompasses 
the view that iron would never have surpassed bronze in popularity unless it was in fact 
harder than bronze. From this basis it has often been presumed that the popularity of iron 
increased from the time it was possible to produce iron (or steel) that was harder than bronze. 
However, this has not been proven by the vast majority of iron objects recovered from that 
period. In fact, the opposite, or at least divergent situation may be the case (McConchie, 
2004:13-21; Muhly et al, 1985:82; Waldbaum, 1978).
Recognition of iron in excavation projects can follow this rough layout (McConchie, 
2004:89-90):
1. A magnet is used to see if the object responds. This is important to exclude other 
types of metal, or stone, that look similar to iron in one of its many guises.
2. Objects are then tested to see if it has a realistic  build up of corrosion. This can be 
aimed at accretion, robustness and density loss.
3. Statistics of the iron finds, i.e. find-location, dimensions and shape.
4. X-ray analysis of samples to determine internal structure.
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It is clear that in many excavation projects only the first 3 stages are likely. So that 
the necessary observation skills of the excavators are a key factor.
4.4  The problems involved in iron development and production
This section is couched in a terminology and understanding based on a modern industrialised 
viewpoint. The reason for this is that this aspect is discussed elsewhere in this thesis, and it is 
as well to lay out the basics and possibilities here, as we know them today.
From its very beginning, iron was a more difficult material to work, because it did not 
melt (i.e. did not transform into liquid phase) at the temperatures used to to melt other metals 
that were worked in LBA. Only when blast furnaces were introduced in more modern times 
was iron’s  temperature raised to a melting point in excess of 1,540 C. Iron could be cast in 
moulds from then on (although that alone was not sufficient to produce quality steel).
It seems clear that the interest in iron technology was increasing, but it was a difficult 
issue. In northern Anatolia there were iron ores which were easily available and gave a good 
result. Their availability enabled the pre-Hittite people there to make a start on iron 
technology quite early. However, it was Cyprus, which is much less fortunately endowed with 
such ores, and possibly didn't even start on iron seriously until after LCIII-A, that “got there 
first”. It was also characteristic for the time and region that some people evidently made 
better quality iron than others, and it wasn't always clear why this was so. It may even have 
been a closely kept secret in some places.
What is clear is that accidental discovery of the ways to smelt iron, for example in a 
camp fire, are highly improbable. Iron only melts at temperatures significantly higher than 
the slag, as well as copper. The main potential of iron had to be revealed through controlled 
pyrotechnical research and development, and this requires expertise and experience with 
pyrotechnics as well as insight into metallurgy. One can say that the working of iron was an 
inevitable technical by-product of copper and lead smelting, in a “development environment” 
(Wertime and Muhly, 1980:1-16). It might be useful to point out here that this occurred only 
after the onset of IA (see discussion later).
Somewhat simplified, it can be said that when placed in a standard (but effective), 
very hot furnace of the period, which at best has a maximum possible temperature below 
about 1400C, iron ore would not become molten, but it would be “spongy”. If taken out and 
hammered at that point, it would be possible to form the iron. If the iron was then placed in a 
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suitable furnace, with plenty of charcoal, and kept there for a while, the iron would absorb 
carbon from the burning charcoal. Thus the iron became “carbonized”, (in other words it 
would be “alloyed”) and moved into a state of “steeliness”, becoming harder. In that state it 
was well on the way to becoming a harder material for weapons than bronze. This process 
had to repeated several times, the iron was hammered, and sometimes folded. The process, 
carried out repeatedly, introduced larger surfaces to the charcoal and uptake of carbon, and 
strengthened the product (van der Merwe & Avery, 1982). However, if kept in the furnace too 
long it might take up too much carbon and then become so-called “cast-iron”, which is brittle. 
It would simply break under hammering.
The hammering was necessary for iron (but not copper or bronze), so that the 
impurities contained might be removed. The iron does not melt, so the impurities from the 
ore and slag etc. remain in the metal. However, even though the iron doesn’t melt, the 
impurities do, so they are in liquid phase at the time the iron is hammered. An experienced 
artisan would have developed a procedure to hammer the iron in a certain pattern, somewhat 
like a laundry roller, to “squeeze” out impurities. This is not at a molecular level, but the 
pockets of impurities are very small and well distributed, so a thorough hammering is 
desirable and expedient. And this needs to be done each time the object comes out of the 
furnace.
After the carbonization step, which might well include many hours of heating and 
hammering, the iron object could be “quenched”. This involves an extremely rapid cooling, 
which tempers the steel so that the final object is hard and resilient. There are a number of 
pitfalls in the entire process, but in principle, a metallurgist would methodically examine the 
failures and learn how to avoid them, once the general principles as set out above had been 
learnt. This process is a further and necessary technical development of metallurgy, after 
development for the copper smelting process. Neither was it intuitive because carbonization 
and quenching does not harden bronze or copper, so a transfer of technology directly from 
copper to iron could not have happened. Therefore it would have required time and resources, 
as well as the interest and experience as a metallurgist working copper and iron ores to 
become fully aware of their qualities and to do the development work involved. It did also 
require a lot of heavy manual work, hammering the iron and maintaining the furnaces (van 
der Merwe & Avery, 1982).
Until recently, research into iron in Anatolia has mainly been oriented toward 
37
technological matters, rather than the symbiosis between society and technology, specifically 
iron. This lacks the aspect of focus on the integration of technology and society, and has not 
been entirely successful. The aim of combination of analysis of technological and social and 
cultural combined in new interpretations has not been accomplished (Sandars, 1978:177).
Research has not managed to prove that the expectation of the innovation of 
hardening iron was the threshold (or gateway) to the rising popularity of iron in LBA and 
early IA. Rather the opposite, for most artefacts of iron either are not hardened, or are not 
uniformly hardened, indicating other that factors may have caused hardening of the object 
(possibly inadvertently). In the same period, iron's popularity rose considerably, indicating 
that uniform hardening of iron was not a requirement. At least, not for the majority of iron 
objects that were made in this period (McConchie, 2004:14-15).
However, simply assessing the amount of iron that was used, in numbers and types of 
objects, raises difficulties. There does not seem to be enough from that period. The amounts 
of iron objects recovered should be regarded as indicators of the types of objects produced, 
not as quantitative measure of the number produced. In addition, where iron production is 
small scale, then the total production is also likely to be small and deposition small 
(McConchie, 2004: 12-21).
In conclusion, for iron being made to steel, it seems possible from the literature that it 
was possible for smiths of the time to make steel. However, there is some reason to believe 
that few, if any, metallurgists of that time were inclined to produce steeled iron. There is not 
an abundance of steel artefacts to be found, so that the process to produce steel must be seen 
as possible, with access to the right materials, conditions and resources, but either certainly 
not easy, or not desirable, or both. 
4.5  The Hittites and iron working in Northern Syria
The Hittite kingdom and other areas in Northern Syria were active in iron production and 
development at an early stage. The Iron Age is generally thought to have started in the last 
quarter of the the third millennium BC ((Yalçın, 1999:177). Iron was used in that same region 
before the Hittite realm existed, although the method of production remains unclear (Yalçın, 
1999; Akanuma, 2008:a, 2008:b). This is supported by some finds from this area and time, 
but they are few (Waldbaum, 1980). Some of the objects could have been made using 
meteoric iron, although tests on a gold-handled iron dagger show low Nickel values. Nickel 
values of about 6 % or more, are indicative of meteoric iron (Yalçın , 1999:180).
38
However, there is some doubt. For analysis results to be of maximum possible 
reliability, samples must be taken from parts of the object in question where there is no doubt 
of the metal's intrinsic stability over time and environment. This preferably from central, 
unused or unexposed locations. The samples in the case of this one artefact (a knife) were 
taken from the end part, where there was advanced corrosion. So the results are possibly 
flawed. Clearly, the desire to avoid damaging the artefacts unduly can be a costly aspect, as 
far as certainty and reliability of results are concerned.
In addition, Yalçın (1999:180) mentions that the nickel content for samples here was 
incorrectly reported in Waldbaum (1980), where they were given a higher value. This means 
that previous conclusions that they were meteoric iron are probably wrong. The point is, that 
previously there was little belief that terrestrial iron was used this early in this area. So the 
possibility of the artefacts being of terrestrial iron is an interesting development.
Other evidence for iron smelting in the 14th century BC does exist. This is based on 
finds of several iron axes, where at least one of these is carbonized. There were several pieces 
of slag from iron smelting and there were also iron nails, some pieces of iron and an iron 
arrow head. These were from contexts in Boğazköy , Anatolia, from the period 1450 – 1200 
BC. These items are evidence that there was iron smelting in this area in the 14th century 
(Yalçın , 1999:182).
Textual evidence of the use and value of iron from the beginning of the 2nd 
millenium BC also exists. Iron was traded at Kültepe at a rate of 1 šekel of iron per 8+ šekel 
of gold (ie 1:8+), and 1:40 for silver. Iron was also a controlled material in trading, and was 
very valuable, symbolising monarchy and power. One document indicates that iron was 
beginning to be used in weapons from the 18th century. A text from that time also tells of 
many hundreds of iron weapons or weapon parts (Yalçın , 1999:182-185).
To sum up, it can be said that iron production started in Anatolia before the 2nd. 
millenium BC. There are at least a dozen finds, of which most were objects with a ceremonial 
or other prestigious role  (Larsen, :55-56). Written texts mentioning iron appear in the 2nd. 
millennium and objects of iron are greater in number. The continuous production of iron 
starts at the end of the 2nd millenium. After this, iron starts to dominate in some regions, 
replacing copper and bronze (Yalçın, 1999:185).
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4.6  Regional iron working
Iron was worked in various places in the region, and bronze artefacts often contain iron and 
some were ferromagnetic. In addition, metallurgical examination of ancient bronze objects 
frequently shows an iron content under 1 % but much higher contents of 10-20 % are also 
found (Strathmore and Aschenbrenner, 1975). It seems improbable that these latter could be 
merely "contaminated" with iron. In some processes sulphide ores are used and these contain 
more iron, which is precipitated into the copper in the furnace. This shows that metallurgists 
probably had to deal with iron itself, or its intrusion into their copper, at a time well before 
1200 BC. 
Waldbaum (1978) in her thesis on iron in BA talks of the distribution of iron then 
based on the finds of iron artefacts. These can be divided here into 3 groups for simplicity: 
low number of artefacts (Palestine, Syria and Cyprus) medium number (Greece) and higher 
number (Anatolia and Egypt). However, the total number artefacts was only 108 when 
Waldbaum summarised them. She also states that the artefacts' forms are indigenous to their 
regions of production, specifically, not to one central place (Waldbaum, 1978:23). However, 
their number seems to be few in relation to bronze, even though there are several authors who 
state that iron smelting began early. For example, Wertime (1973:875) states that the first use 
of iron in Anatolia (pre-Hittites and Hittites) as well as Mesopotamia occurred in the late 
third and early second millennium B.C. This is also stated by Yalçın (1999:180). However, he 
also raises a matter which clouds the issue on early iron finds. Use of meteoric iron yields a 
superior iron product than use of iron from other sources (Yalçın, 1999). Meteoric iron lies on 
the Earth's surface and seems to have been distributed unevenly geographically, being more 
plentiful in some regions. One should also bear in mind that we do not know if or what 
selection criteria might have been adhered to while collecting it.
The importance or influence of iron technology on the LBA collapse is a relevant 
issue. As seen above, iron technology did exist at that time, and the artefacts demonstrate this. 
However, the significance of iron objects originating after 1200 BC (but before 900 BC) must 
be demonstrated by comparison with iron objects from before 1200 BC Waldbaum (1978;17). 
4.7  Numbers of iron artefacts in the eastern Mediterranean
The following depends very much on the work by Waldbaum (1978), where she presents a 
publication (based on her PhD thesis) about the transition from bronze to iron in this area. 
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She presents a lot of data which I have tried to present in a different way, in the light of more 
recent work, excavations and articles on the same theme. There were finds of more than 108 
iron artefacts from the Eastern Mediterranean before 1200 BC, whereof 15 weapons, 31 tools, 
33+ jewellery, and 29 were miscellaneous. These numbers constitute too small a selection to 
support a sound statistical analysis,, and they are probably not representative for the total 
number of iron objects in use at the time, or their categories. For example, every day 
implements of iron are more easily discarded or lost, and rapidly oxidise (rust). They would 
only in few cases have been included in grave goods in later periods. However, it is notable 
that iron has been worked into objects in combination with more precious metals, so that it is 
apparent that it was highly regarded, and has been found in some "rich" graves. Nevertheless 
it cannot be said that there has been any real attempt to replace bronze with iron in any 
significant way before 1200 BC (Waldbaum, 1978;23).
For the region of the eastern Mediterranean iron finds are shown in figure 6. This is 
intended to show the differences between the different parts of the region. Unfortunately, the 
most interesting area, Anatolia, has so little data that it has been dropped, as has Egypt. The 
figure 6 shows that there is a significant increase in finds of iron artefacts throughout the 
region, from the 12th century, for Palestine and Greece (with Crete and the Islands), a slight 
hitch in the 11th century for Syria, but a quite different development for Cyprus.
Assuming that finds of iron and other metals from the 12th, 11th and 10th centuries 
in the region indicate preferences in society, the following observation can be made:
• Palestine: For weapons and armour we see that bronze dominated the 12th century at 
98% preference. By the 10th century iron was preferred at 56%. For tools iron went 
from 10% preference to be more popular (60% against 40% for bronze). For Jewellery 
the preference for bronze was much greater than other metals (70%) in the 10th.
• It is interesting to note that iron went from very low preference to 50-60 % in the 
period, and gold went from 42 % preference to 10 % in the period. This could imply a 
change in society, causing iron to replace bronze as the “working metal” at the same 
time as gold is replaced by bronze as the “luxury metal”. Palestine has yielded the 
most representative number of finds with respect to the numbers of objects of the 
various metals for the periods examined (Waldbaum, 1978;38-42).
• Syria: For weapons and armour the situation in the period is similar to that in 
Palestine. But for tools the situation is very, extremely, different. Here, iron tools were 
41
25% of the total of iron finds for the 12th century, and 86-87% of the total for 11th 
and 10th centuries. This shows clearly that iron tools were manifest after the collapse 
(1200 BC).
• We see the flattening of the curve (figure  4) for the 11th century for both Syria and 
Cyprus, which implies changes. The data, however, is enough to base a hypothesis on. 
The curve reflects almost no growth in iron use, but the data shows a stunning rise to 
87 % dominance of iron, so we must hypothesise that something abnormal had 
happened. One possible factor in that particular mix is the failure of both Ugarit and 
the Hittite Empire, which probably would have caused development to stumble a bit 
in the 11th century, before picking up again in the 12th. The sting in the tail is that 
while the curve for the 10th century (figure  6) shows increases in iron finds, the 
proportion of iron to bronze does not change much (iron 86 % - bronze 14 %).
•  For jewellery iron was generally more popular than in Palestine. But gold simply 
vanished after the 12th century. Iron dominated at over 50 % thereafter, with bronze at 
42% (11th c.) and 37 % (10th c.), and silver and lead barely represented in the 
statistics.
• Cyprus: For weapons and armour, and for tools the trends in the period are similar to 
Palestine. But for jewellery bronze dominated with 58 – 66 % for the 12th., 11th., and 
10th centuries. The big surprise is that gold is fairly stable at just over 30 %. Vastly 
superior to Syria. In other words an affluent place to be in the transition period. The 
flat trend for iron (figure  6) could also be interpreted in part of the function Cyprus 
had as metallurgical workshop in the Mediterranean. They probably had reserves of 
bronze at all levels of society after the collapse, at the same time as they may well 
have produced iron objects for distribution in the near-regions of the Mediterranean. 
In other words they might have manufactured it, but exchanged most with “buyers” 
abroad.
• Greece, Crete, Aegean islands: For weapons and armour, and for tools the trends in 
the period here are also similar to Palestine. However, there are signs of some 
variation from the pattern. Iron is adopted more rapidly in the 11th and 10 centuries, 
ending at about 65 – 70 % for weapons and armour, and 100 % for tools. For 
jewellery the 12th century is at about 50 %, but drops dramatically to about 4 % and 3 
% in the 11th and 10th centuries.
42
As said already, data for Anatolia and Egypt are lacking, but basic iron technology 
was in some regions simpler than the production technology for bronze, although the finished 
product was not so hard. The use of better technology yields steel. The necessary knowledge 
of this technique probably existed in parts of Anatolia. In the following, the development in 
iron technology is in many cases not entirely clear, neither chronologically, technologically 
nor quantitatively. These aspects will be dealt with in the main discussion part of the thesis.
4.8  Developments in iron production
The Anatolian ability to produce steel, requiring the carbonization of iron in the production 
process is confirmed by Muhly et al (1985).  Finds of iron used for jewellery is the largest 
class, but the other classes (tools and miscellaneous) are pretty similar in size, depending 
more on how you care to classify them (Waldbaum, 1978:23)
Steel is known to have been produced by at least the 11th century BC (Smith et al, 
1984), who states that a dagger fragment was in a dated context and is believed to be one of 
the earliest artefacts of steel in the region. This demonstrates the possibility of steel 
production at approximately the time of the LBA collapse. Unfortunately we cannot from this 
alone postulate its general relevance or popularity.
However, there is evidence to suggest that hardness was not the only, or even the 
principal characteristic for selecting iron in preference to bronze (McConchie, 2004:15-18). 
Also, in LBA at Hama, Syria, jewellery of iron was found more often in the graves of the 
ordinary people. It was apparently not the exclusive (and expensive) property of the elites 
(McConchie, 2004:18-21). This provokes the idea that iron was on the way to be accepted for 
what it actually was (an affordable, locally producible utilitarian metal), rather than what it 
wasn't in comparison with another utilitarian metal.
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5  Types of mining operational organisation
In the case of early copper production in the Polis Region, western Cyprus, three main 
models of organisation have been suggested: 1. State organised, full-time and large scale; 2. 
local, village based and seasonal; 3. transitional, mobilized and local. It is beyond the scope 
of this project to follow up all the types, but it can probably be said that all 3 are points on a 
gradient from local industry, for a nearby village, to a much larger operation with many mines 
in a network and an overseas distribution network. This “model” hypothesis applies well to 
the probable development in the eastern Mediterranean from early BA to about LCI period (c. 
1700-1400 BC), when localised operations were the main activity (type 2) and thereafter 
types 1 and 3 probably becoming more common as the industry expanded, before crashing in 
1200 BC . Copper was is apparently produced until the Late Medieval period (Raber, 1987).
The same author goes on to discuss the environmental constraints on the industry, 
which were also important. The necessity of producing charcoal for the various processes is 
potentially a huge problem, both for the metallurgists, but also for environmental reasons.  He 
estimates that in the period CA (Cypriot-Archaic) to Hellenistic, about 3,900 tons of copper 
was produced here. This is based on 36,100 tons of slag, and is roughly equivalent to 13 tons 
per annum in the period. Deforestation was rife within c. 60 km2. The area was originally 
densely forested Raber (1987).
5.1  A typical small-scale mining operation
In the excavations at Politiko Phorades, Cyprus, through several seasons up to 2000, 
researchers found 3.5 tons of slag, many tuyères, fragments of furnace lining, and some 
gossan (gossan is an iron-containing secondary deposit, usually reddish, occurring above a 
deposit of a metallic ore [Oxford, 2005]). There was also a stone-lined pit which was 
believed to be a part of the process, but what function it might have had was unknown. The 
pit was not a furnace because in that period furnaces were vertical above ground level, and of 
clay. Further conclusions were that the metallurgic workshop was active at times when 
agricultural activity was down, probably annually. Secondly it was suggested that this was 
typical for the area of the Troodos mountains.
At  Politiko Phorades the findings indicate that the workshop produced a matte, not a 
refined copper (it is very unusual to find matte on site, because normally it all goes to 
secondary processing). It was a partially reduced copper sulphide, obtained by roasting 
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copper ore. Further processing of this product, either on the production site, or possibly 
elsewhere, would have resulted in production of an ingot of copper. The form of the slag 
found on site was consistent with a circular matte, with a weight about 44 lbs (Knapp et al, 
2001:206-207). The resulting copper would have weighed less. It is from the secondary 
melting process that such product (matte) could be re-smelted, with product from other 
mines, into ox-hide ingots. 
A further conclusion, supported by findings of snail shells in the annual accumulation 
layer on site, is that the metallurgic workshop was only operational part time (when 
agriculture was in its annual low activity period). This was the rule up to about 1600 BC, but 
at some time thereafter it probably became a full-time operated mine. It would have been 
initially dependant and coordinated with a nearby settlement for food and cultural activity, 
but after 1600 BC it would have been part of a regional network of continuously operational 
mines. This was a result of the growth in the industry and establishment of larger regional 
administrations under more powerful elites (Knapp et al, 2001).
The Late Cypriot pottery (ca 1700 – 1050 BC) recovered here was a style thought to 
be favoured by elite groups: Black slip, White Slip, Red Lustrous Wheel Made, Base Ring, 
among others. All were found mainly within the clearly stratified metalworking levels, and 
there was very little coarse ware. The site seems to have a specialized nature, since the 
pottery recovered was luxury ware with very little “common” ware. The mine itself was 
located near to mineral deposits, fuel, water, and refractory clay. Thus making available the 
ore and flux, and a nearby creek providing water and clay for construction of the furnaces, as 
well as fuel for the charcoal. A spring near the site could have been used for drinking water 
for the workers (important, and especially so in summer months). The probable source of ore 
was only 800 m away ( (Knapp et al, 2001).
5.2  Impacts on the regional ecosystem
There is not much in the literature on deforestation or ecological consequences of the BA 
metallurgical activities, but there appears to be a general consensus that the impact was 
severe in the vicinity of the mines. This would probably have been the result of the operators 
both cutting trees for firing furnaces (using charcoal), and polluting the area with smoke and 
sulphurous gas (e.g. from roasting ores). In principle, sulphurous gas could lead to acid rain 
which kills vegetation if the discharge is prolonged and dense enough. In addition, the 
production of charcoal (burning wood without access to oxygen) also releases mixtures of 
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CO, H2, CO2 and N2 gasses. These can also lead to acid rain. This can kill vegetation by 
falling on to it, but in turn also ends up in the streams and rivers, with impacts on the biota 
there. Whether this was a major impact regionally is not easy to say without perhaps more 
experimental archaeological projects, which are obviously beyond the scope here.
That there has been extensive erosion is shown by several projects, but usually for 
certain specified sites. Nevertheless, descriptions by van Andel et al (1990) make it clear that 
for some regions in Greece, erosion in the Holocene period is anthropogenic in origin. 
Assuming that similar influences will apply to other parts of the region, it is likely that the 
exacerbated erosion which they found had occurred in BA in their investigation, also applies 
more generally. Their findings were that the depositions of alluvium in the plains at the foot 
of hillsides came from the slopes above them. This was  attributed to various human 
activities, but none to copper production. Depending on the density of mining operations in 
the area, it might well be that the erosion caused would be of both agricultural and mining 
activities.
 There had been drastic ecological changes with anthropological causes in the 
Mediterranean region since early Neolithic, because of use and misuse of land. There was 
considerably more forest and other vegetation before BA. All of the lowland forest had gone, 
and was replaced by maquis (shrub lands) and later by thorny scrub, by the start of BA. 
Erosion had also affected the region where deforestation had occurred, removing soil, salts, 
nutrients and minerals. The population had already started various husbandry practices to 
control the negative effects. But the forest was gone in the lowlands Angel (1972:89). There 
were also similar conclusions, for eastern Anatolia (Willcox, 1974).  There is support for a the 
desertification hypothesis, as well as for communal reactions on perpetrators in the ancient/ 
classical world, on people who damaged the ecosystem (Hughes, 1983). Thus was born the 
concept of environmental protection.
But if this helped is a moot point. Both use of timber for construction of various 
types of structure and for pyrotechnology (furnaces etc.) to make tiles, bricks and process 
metals, caused further major deforestation (Wertime, 1983). Elephants were found in northern 
Syria in the second millennia BC. Increased demand for pyrotechnics and fuel in the run up 
to, and the early stages of the IA caused deforestation in their habitat, and extinction of the 
species, who probably wandered into the area at some time before the second millennia 
(Miller, 1986).
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6  Societies, collapse and metallurgy
The collapse of the Hittite kingdom has been accredited to natural forces, such as earthquakes 
(e.g. Nur and Cline, 2000) or climatic events, which Kuniholm (1990) regards as very 
uncertain. Theories of widespread and prolonged drought in the eastern Mediterranean are 
discussed by Drews (1992) who finds them not reliable. Other explanatory devices are the 
introduction of iron technology,  enabling the production of superior weapons with which to 
overthrow several Bronze Age kingdoms, or the development of new types of weapons and 
tactics, with the same purpose. Bryce (1998:374-377) dismisses all the above theories as 
lacking substance. Although there could have been droughts in various areas, that could have 
been long, and earthquakes almost certainly occurred from time to time, some groups may 
have had iron weapons etc., but there is simply not enough evidence to support any of them 
as fully responsible for the extent of disturbance and chaos on a scale big enough to 
overthrow all states in the region and plunge it into chaos.
In the following the two main facets of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean 
region are in focus. On the one hand the actual meaning (and the causes) of collapse, and on 
the other the changes in perception of societies as regards their own situation and society, as 
well as their perception of technology, especially iron. Anatolia is the main focus from the 
point of view of the process of collapse, but other states are in a general way also affected. 
Anatolia was the main factor as regards iron, and also was the first major power to collapse
6.1  The mechanisms of collapse
Collapse is a matter of the socio-political sphere, and in this thesis  is defined: “A society has 
collapsed when it displays a rapid, significant loss of an established level of socio-political 
complexity” (Tainter, 1988:4). Collapse is apparent when there are significant reductions of 
the following characteristics:
• stratification of society and social differentiation
• regulation of economic and occupational specialization; centralized control by elites
• behavioural control
• investment in the epiphenomena of complexity (architecture, art, literature etc.)
• information flow, in all respects
• sharing , trading or distribution of resources
• organization of individuals and groups
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• territorial integrity, integration and size.
A society has not necessarily collapsed if only one of these characteristics is reduced, 
but probably has collapsed if all are reduced significantly. There might also be cases of 
collapse where this list will not apply. Only very few examples of such societies are known 
archaeologically, but it seems probable that collapse is a general process and has occurred a 
lot more than one would think (Tainter, 1988:4-5).
Tainter (1988) posits 11 main explanatory categories in collapse theory:
• Depletion of vital resources
• Establishment of a new resource base
• Insurmountable catastrophes
• Inappropriate response to challenges
• Other complex societies
• Invasions/intruders
• Class conflict and/or inappropriate elite behaviour
• Dysfunction in the society
• Religious or mystical factors
• Chance events occurring in an unfortunate combination and short period
• Economic matters
 Several of these types of event could bring down a society on their own. However, 
just the onset of difficulties is not always enough to cause the society's collapse. A society 
might react to problems in different ways, where a critical situation can be turned into an 
initiative leading to growth, instead of a collapse. So it is not always given that a society in 
crisis will collapse. Success and survival also depends on how the society chooses to tackle 
the problems that beset it  (Tainter1988:42, 51; Diamond, 2005; Fergusson, 2010; Jacobsen 
and Adams, 1958).
This possibility of tackling problems in a manner that allow some flexibility, thereby 
avoiding collapse to a significantly lower level of complexity, has been demonstrated by 
several cultures. The importance of this strategy has also been emphasised by the 
diametrically opposite “failure to adapt” argument which has been put forward to explain 
why some collapses happened. In this line of reasoning, the onset of problems to the society 
could have been responded to with some changes by the society, which would have reduced 
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the impact and maybe avoided collapse. But society in crisis might also fail to respond 
appropriately, and so collapses. In this respect, some have suggested positive feedback loops, 
which simply generate more of the “wrong response” when stimulated. In this scenario it is 
impossible to change the normal response to certain types of event, and so the situation is 
made more volatile and collapse is ultimately inevitable (Tainter, 1988:59-61).
Complex societies are, by their nature and structure, problem solving organisations. 
When they collapse, then the problem often lies within the society itself, not externally. 
Tainter has studied collapse events in order to find a universal theoretical explanation. He has 
failed in this, but does comment positively on the economic model explanation, thinking it 
the best alternative (Tainter, 1988:87-90).
In summary, collapse is a recurring event in human history. Stratified society 
becomes flatter, with a loss of power and influence in the elite classes, who are perhaps 
replaced by headmen or chiefs in a smaller group, if they survive. For population also 
shrinks. The usual chain of events is the occurrence of increasing numbers of irksome 
problems, costs consequently increase manifold, perhaps also a positive feedback mechanism 
kicks in, and probably the decline in marginal returns for the society goes critical and causes 
the final collapse (Tainter, 1988:192-194; Fergusson, 2010; Tainter, 2006).
6.2  The collapse of the Hittites
The Hittites were central to the PRC. It is thought that they collapsed first, but possibly 
synchronously with Ugarit, and maybe even the Ahhiyawa. Liverani (1987) points out that 
the palace-based societies had all the formal functions of the state within the palace and its 
functions. So when the collapse of the palace occurred, so did the society lose all its formal 
state functions and bureaucracy. After that there was no chance of immediate recovery. The 
11 criteria presented by Tainter for the collapse of complex societies can be used to assess the 
risk that the Hittites experienced:
Economic matters: Already at the time of the end of the Assyrian colonies there 
were varying conditions of unrest. So they terminated their activities just before the formation 
of the Hittite kingdom. The Hittites introduced a more ordered society, but the cost was an 
increase in complexity. There had to be an army to keep order, and to defend the interests of 
the parent state. This in turn had to grow, to support the increasing state overhead of which 
the elite classes had to be a part. There had to be international agreements, palaces, and all the 
paraphernalia of government. There would be wars, and the state structure is better suited to 
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conduct such affairs. In short, there was change from lower cost, lower complexity 
commercialism for a higher complexity state structure. It is highly probable that the cost of 
the state organisation would have increased throughout the period. The Law of Diminishing 
Returns would almost certainly have applied. For every initiative, the return on investment 
would fall, and this could continue to fall year after year.
Wars in the last stages of the kingdom were frequent. There was considerable 
disagreement within the central dynasty. At times the kings were rendered more or less 
impotent, and perhaps feared for their very lives. Then there is a king who is a stronger 
personality, that can persuade or manipulate people to support his ideas. But this process is 
also subject to the Law of Diminishing Returns. An attitude that is flexible enough without 
being too malleable, so that it does not appear that king is weak, is difficult to manage in a 
dynastic tradition of ruling. So that it also becomes less effective as time goes on. 
Depletion of vital resources: We do not have much data on this, but the onset of a 
scarcity of tin available to the Hittites was possible. The Hittites used iron weapons at the 
battle of Kadesh, and written sources indicate a lot more iron in Anatolia than we have found 
to date. Production of iron in the late 2nd millennium was perhaps not a good exchange 
object against bronze. But if trade was failing internationally, then Hittite goods would be 
difficult to exchange on the markets, and they may have found it expedient to be as self 
sufficient as possible, especially possible as regards iron.
Inappropriate response to challenges: The Hittites faced many challenges, and 
even on a basis of a 50 % success rate, there would be enough failures to generate deficits 
economically. As this got worse, so would the population find things more irksome.
Invasions/intruders: There were a number of enemies, e.g. the Kaska and the 
Ahhiyawa , but no direct invasions. This would probably be placed in the previous class.
Other complex societies: These could in the last event, in theory, take over any of 
the other polities that were failing, but they were all under great stress themselves. Tainter 
states that in a conglomerate of complex societies, collapse is not possible for various 
reasons. Especially that only in a condition of a complex society isolated in some respects can 
a collapse occur. Since so many of the complex societies collapsed in so short a time implies 
a chain of events that caused either that all states simultaneously succumbed or did so one 
after the other in a short space of time.
Dysfunction in the society: This was likely as a result of the infighting that occurred 
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in the central dynastic family of the Hittites.
Chance events occurring in an unfortunate combination and short period: This 
probably happened in the region on a frequent basis as the collapse developed.
Establishment of a new resource base: The transition to a new metal (iron). This is 
discussed later, but the development and use of iron would ultimately work to reduced the 
Hittite elites' control over the economy and populace, and reduced economic returns would 
feed negatively into the law of diminishing returns, and they would experience even more 
problems.
6.3  After the collapse
Within a few generations after their collapse, the Hittite kingdom was little remembered. The 
interesting question is what happened to the people who populated their world, and who 
inherited whatever could be salvaged from the ruins? Bryce (1998:381) says that the centres 
totally destroyed were only Hattusa and Ugarit and the ones burnt were one west of the 
capital and some east of it. There is absolutely no evidence of damage in west Anatolia. In the 
other Hittite domains only a few were destroyed, for the rest were just left abandoned by the 
populace. There does not appear to have been any widespread destruction and killing, just a 
widespread desertion of their homes and lands. Many people “just up and went”. This 
migration happened in a short space of time, and just after the Hittite society was terminated 
(Hawkins, 1974).
However, some groups, especially the Lukka, either returned or perhaps in part, 
remained. They were in the main Luwian speaking, and this is evident from the continued use 
of the same names for their gods, and slightly adapted place and personal names, based on 
traditional Luwian ones, after the collapse. Similarly along the western coast, small centres of 
population as well as larger, like Millewanda/Milawata, seem to have continued to live in the 
same places at least until the Iron Age, for some as long as into the Roman period. At some 
point after the collapse they received numbers of Greek speaking migrants from across the 
Aegean which formed the basis for the region known later as Ionia.
On the eastern side of Hytta, the kingdom of Carchemish which was one of the two 
Hittite viceregal seats in Syria passed through the collapse with relatively little damage. In 
fact there was claim that a part of the Hittite royal dynasty that had moved to the kingdom (or 
coalesced there) after the collapse. However, although Carchemish prospered, the central 
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Hittite dynasty had not survived the upheavals and end of Hattusa. This area was a Hittite 
territory along the west bank of the Euphrates, and attracted more of the surviving elite of the 
Hittites, although none of the central dynasty. They became involved in the development of 
the so-called Neo- Hittite culture (Bryce, 2012:9-32). This persisted perhaps until biblical 
times and is alluded to several times in biblical literature (Bryce, 1998:380-385).
The successors to the Hittite king in central Anatolia included, by their own claims, 
kings of smaller kingdoms. They claimed to be related by blood to the lost central dynasty 
and titled themselves as “Great Kings”. One whose father was Hartapu, who in turn was the 
son of the Great King Mursili. It is not entirely clear how they were in fact connected to the 
central Hittite dynasty, if indeed they were. Nevertheless it does seem probable that there was 
a connection at least to a smaller kingdom Karatepe (Azatiwataya), of the Hittite realm, in 
eastern Cilicia.
The Hittite realm represents the worst case scenario, but Cyprus was the apposite 
opposite. All that could go wrong seems to have gone wrong with the Hittites, but for Cyprus, 
after or during the collapse (and continuing into the 11th century) there was an initial 
negative economic reaction to the changes, with following migration to the island, 
establishment of new coastal settlements and probably an improvement economically. The 
start of the IA seems to have gone well for Cyprus (Negbi, 2005:27-31).
In a regional perspective, it might be said that the Palaces had controlled all high 
value materials, and exchange of much of these between states was by formal exchanges of 
royal gifting (Sherratt, 2000:83).  Sherratt (2000:82) suggests also that there is a connection 
between the collapse of the centralised elite controlled economy and the development of 
utilitarian iron. Developments with regard to iron also prevented the re-emergence of 
centralised economies, and this aspect made iron-working activity important (Sherratt and 
Sherratt, 1993:362-4). This in effect meant that after the collapse, control of high value bulk 
materials was devolved from palaces to lower levels, e.g. temples, and mercantile enterprises, 
that became the main traders. The production of iron was not under palace control, so any 
group, company or society could engage in producing iron wares (if they had the knowledge 
and resources).
6.4  Summary
The Hittite realm was established in 1620 BC at the start of the strongest growth 
economically that the eastern Mediterranean had seen until then. The Hittite realm grew with 
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trade through the caravan routes to Mesopotamia, as well as sea routes to Egypt and the 
Levant (and probably Cyprus) of textiles and minerals (and metals) for tin, which was needed 
for their own bronze production. The Hittites were continually under pressure, from external 
enemies and internal disagreement. The Kaska were always a potential problem, and may 
well have been the executive agent in their final demise. But the Kaska had always been a 
problem, who the Hittites had always bested, so their success in quelling their oldest 
adversary cannot have been of their own device.
As the crisis developed, the Hittites, who were the first to develop iron, were the first 
to collapse. Possibly they were the first to reach a critical state and then imploded. Their 
extreme circumstances, after wars and other problems, possibly caused an insurrection by the 
people in the capital of Hattusa. In any case, their demise fuelled the migration problems in 
the region, and helped bring down other complex societies.
The region had gone into a collapse, and the elite power structure had lost its grip on 
the complex societies. Iron development and the freer markets were on the ascension, and 
new commercially oriented agents and groups were on the rise. 
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7  Changes in perception, Discussion, Conclusions
This discussion will treat the various theoretical models for the adoption of iron in preference 
to bronze or during shortage of bronze, before, during or after the PRC event. Earlier it was 
pointed out that some popular explanatory models are as follows:
1. A shortage of tin, leading to an inability to make the alloy of copper and tin (bronze)
2. A quality of hardened, tempered iron, that was superior to bronze
3. Another reason, here called a change in perception, i.e. iron was preferred because it 
was perceived to be more attractive than bronze for some other reason.
The transition from the bronze age to the iron age may have been caused by any 
(combination) of these factors. 
7.1  Relative scarcity of bronze, and possible collapse of trade networks
The first of the main theories above, concerning iron's entry onto the technological and 
cultural arenas in LBA and very early IA, has been that bronze was becoming difficult to 
acquire in the Mediterranean. According to this theory, the more accessible, but less desirable 
iron would gain ground at the cost of the less accessible but more desirable bronze. Snodgrass 
(1980:348-349) argues for a scarcity of bronze in the last part of the second millenium, and 
that this might have caused a greater demand for iron, as an alternative. A further element in 
this respect is the theory of a break-down of trade networks in the late 2nd millenium BC, e.g. 
the one through the Northern Euphrates (McConchie, 2004:16; Waldbaum, 1978:65, 71-73).  
Nevertheless, the weakening of supply because of closure of the routes might have 
had the effect of reducing access to resources, but doesn't seem to have been catastrophic: 
• There was extensive bronze-making debris at Hasanlu. Other Western Iranian sites 
also show that there was plenty of bronze from the period LBA to early IA. So it 
seems there is little basis in the claim that breakdown in trade networks led to scarcity 
of bronze, and thus caused a move toward iron (McConchie, 2004:16).
• When the trade routes to Urartu and Assyria were developed in the early first 
millennium BC, copper and tin were important exchange commodities. Bronze was at 
that time a viable and accessible alternative, but iron continued to be used and it 
retained its popularity, at a similar level to the period preceding the opening of the 
trade routes (McConchie, 2004:17).
54
So the argument that trade network collapsed and led to bronze shortage and thus to 
growth in the popularity of iron is not entirely valid for these cultures. The end of LBA was a 
time of crisis in most of the cultures of the eastern Mediterranean, but the explanation often 
put forward, that iron was widely available and tin was in short supply is not strong enough in 
itself (Budd and Taylor, 1995:138-9). There is also a theory that there was more than enough 
bronze to be found in the region at that time (Sherratt, 2000:83). There may have been a 
growth in the use iron because of a new preference for that metal (McConchie, 2004:16-17).
7.2  Hardened, tempered steel
A different point of view often held by modern authors is that tempered and/or hardened iron 
would always be preferable to bronze. But this springs from a modern viewpoint, that 
hardened steel is the best utilitarian metal of the two. This is not necessarily the view held by 
people in the ancient world. Superior hardness was probably not the criteria for iron objects 
in the LBA.
McConchie examined the archaeological record for iron in the period following the 
start of the IA. It appeared from this that there were ways to harden iron which the smiths 
would possibly have been familiar with, either by experience or knowledge of particular 
combinations of ores and techniques, but very few artefacts from the first half of the first 
millennium BC actually are hardened iron (steel) (McConchie, 2004:21). One possible 
advantage is that iron swords which were not hardened, would not shatter in battle but bend, 
thereby allowing the users to bend them straight again. Harder bronze weapons could break 
in battle and thus would have to be returned to a bronze smith for repair (McConchie, 
2004:18; van der Merwe & Avery, 1982:146-149).
Examination of some artefacts of greater hardness have shown variation in carbon 
content. One hypothesis about such objects is that some blooms (ores) simply contain carbon 
in varying quantities, for natural reasons or because of unintentional variations in the various 
process and the furnace priming. Further processing these in a standard way to produce iron 
would have produced objects of varying hardness, with parts of the same object harder (with 
more carbon) than others. So that it would seem that smiths could have produced hardened 
iron, where they had in reality just intended to produce standard mild iron (Stech-Wheeler et 
al, 1981:245-247; McConchie, 2004:19-21).
Generally, one can say that even in the early iron age there does not appear to be 
much hardened iron (steel) in existence, but plenty of the softer (or less brittle) iron types. 
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There is a plethora  of tools and weapons that were excavated in the Urartian territory 
(eastern Anatolia, formerly part of the Hittite realm). There simply does not appear to have 
been any consistent attempt to deliberately carburise or otherwise harden products of iron 
until well into the IA (McConchie, 2004:15,27; Meyer, 2008:65-68).
7.3  Iron production as a small local operation
 Iron known from written sources is more plentiful than the actual numbers of artefacts found 
in museums today, since the rate of preservation for iron is more like an organic item 
(McConchie 2004:12). Also, iron has varied in value, considered a valuable metal in the early 
stages. Iron became more frequently used  in a gradual way, and mining and metal production 
was often done in village or smaller populated area, at locally known mines. Deposits of iron 
are often found in the same places as copper, and the mines can be very limited in “footprint” 
above ground (Waldbaum, 1978; McConchie, 2004). These mines were used in agricultural 
“slack” seasons, and the metal produced probably at the same time. This means it was a 
“small local operation” in mining and smithing, similar to the copper mining at Politiko 
Phorades in Cyprus (Knapp et al, 2001).
Another thing is that iron products (from its ores) were probably not traded in the 
same manner as bronze and copper. Since iron production was in large part a local affair (as 
copper production had been in the early stages) iron could be produced more on a local 
demand basis. It was used to produce tools and other objects that were harder wearing than 
wood. It could also be taken to the local “blacksmith” for re-cycling (heating, forging and 
“welding” or joining) with other iron objects or scrap. This manner of iron production 
process is more suitable to a society at a lower level of complexity. It does not require so 
much infrastructure such as state control or inputs, long transportation routes to market, or 
complicated transactions to acquire the raw materials. Most of the resources required are 
available at short distance from the mining village, as in Politico Phorades.
There was also an advantage of economy, in using iron. The processing of iron is 
more cost-effective than for bronze Wertime(1983). This would also make it more attractive 
to small alchemy projects and sites. Once the iron was processed and the objects made, the 
process was finished. Unlike copper, which required tin transported over long distances in 
order to make the final bronze objects. Modern approaches to the evaluation of ancient iron 
production and variety of types produced tend to undervalue the importance of small-scale 
iron production to the smaller societies. These workshops would be smaller and local. 
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Objects like these would have been re-cycled or mislaid, and thereby lost to the 
archaeological record. Where bronze or copper is concerned, archaeologists can look for 
moulds and other pertinent objects. But for iron, it was done by smiths, manually, leaving no 
such very specific tools.
Quite possibly, some jewellery could have been produced also. This type of use 
would probably not change in a predominantly agricultural environment (the products were 
intended primarily for local usage), so once the design had been developed for a specific use 
it would not need to be changed radically over time (Waldbaum, 1978; McConchie, 2004).
Prestige items made from meteoric iron had a high price, because there wasn't much 
of it. As soon as it became possible to mine the ore, then charcoal heat and then hammer it to 
produce a product similar to wrought iron, then it would have become a product that many 
could use, at a cheaper price per item than bronze. Production methods for iron would also 
allow relatively ordinary people with a modest economic backing to become smiths. They 
would be able to function in small communities in most parts of the region, supplying local 
communities with metal products. As long as they had access to iron ore, and charcoal.
It is probable that most iron produced in LBA and 12th to 9th centuries BC was not 
as hard as steel. It is also likely that in the next 1-3 centuries after LBA there was not much 
“steeled” iron. At the same time, there was still bronze in the market which was de-regulated 
after the collapse of the elite controlled complex societies. 
One of the indicative techniques in the period right after the PRC was the production 
of iron knives on Cyprus, which had bronze rivets in the handle. At the same time in the 
Aegean, knives were all-bronze (Snodgrass, 1980:346-8). Given that Cyprus was more 
advanced in iron production than was the Aegean, this bronze rivet technique indicates that 
they had problems making iron rivets, but bronze was available, and used. This could mean 
that economic constraints were working. Iron could be produced cheaper than bronze, but 
they had to used bronze for handle rivets.  
It is clear from the archaeological record that there must have been destruction of 
centres of population and culture, armed confrontations and migrations or invasions. All 
indicate a time of crisis. It is during this difficult time that iron possibly “forges” ahead and 
starts to nudge bronze off its pedestal as the major metal in the region.
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7.4  The elites' gifting and exchange systems in the region
The economic exchange system was based on gifting between elites. The main exchange 
commodity was metals, which are suitable for that role as well as having the characteristics of 
being functional as finished products. Bronze, silver, gold and lead are also particularly 
suitable in a role as stored reserves over time. They don't become degraded physically in this 
role. Gifts of metals were ideal, but heavy. The gifting system is based on giving and 
receiving gifts. This within a framework of mutual expectation.  There is in action an 
obligation on both sides, so that it is not a truly stochastic process. But there is a mutual 
understanding that the gift that is given by one party and received by a second party, should 
be met with a gift that is just as valuable, to be sent in return to the first party. In other words 
an equal value exchange of materials (Mauss, 1974; Moran, 1992; Morris, 1986; Zaccagnini, 
1987).
The gifting occurred between groups, represented by the group's elites. The elites 
controlled the domestic bulk metal business and international exchanges, and took control of 
the gifts received, and themselves secured all reserves in their palaces. But the elites had also 
an obligation within their group (i.e. to the people), and gifting to them was necessary. They 
had to distribute the resources coming in to their subjects, who were in general dependant on 
the resources. This in theory obligated the people, who had to give something back, and here 
that something was probably their time and labour (Mauss, 1974). The system was thorough 
in that all artisans and workers/specialists were fully employed by the palaces. The only 
slaves that were employed there were weavers (Zaccagnini, 1983). However, this can't have 
been the whole story. There are often enough time-limited projects which demand large 
numbers in manpower, such as road building, new palace structures, extensions to ports etc. 
At that time such people would be the first to be “laid off” if the economy developed even 
small problems, so that any reversal would immediately cause bigger problems. It should also 
be said that at the end of the LBA a free labour market appeared (Zaccagnini, 1983). This as a 
probable result of the collapse of the palaces.
Gift exchange was mostly a luxury or prestige item exchange. Gold was paramount, 
women (generally) were extremely difficult to get as a wife by exchange, but in the case of 
Egyptian princesses, the sky was the limit for their exchange value (Zaccagnini, 1987). This 
is obviously the pinnacle of the exchange system, but it's mentioned here in contrast to the 
probable requirements of the ordinary people in those societies. The question is: was the 
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palace's exchange arrangements seen as reasonable by the majority of the people? What if the 
people came to the opinion that the system did not work in their interest, or that perhaps 
inflation and cut-backs caused them too much hardship?
It follows from Mauss (1974) that part of the relationship is a moral obligation on the 
part of the elites, who are the part in the relationship that had real power. It is probable that 
with the passage of time, the people came to consider the contract as not properly honoured 
by the elites. The people would expect something in return for their time and labour (e.g. 
food, materials, security), and if the elites provided too little of it, the people might consider 
their moral obligation to be in neglect, and then feel they were justified in taking some 
initiative to ease their own situation, as they experienced it.
There are many ways to do this, but there are 2 ways that seem more obvious. They 
could in theory enter a state of civil disobedience (very unlikely), or they could maybe “get a 
second job”. We have already considered iron production as a sort of “small local operation”, 
and this entails groups of people who engage privately in alchemy, the sort of activity that is 
not easily seen by the society as a whole. This strategy has several attractive returns. Firstly, 
to produce iron, the ore has to be mined, but people are not so dependant upon distribution of 
resources from the elites. This means the obligation of giving of their time and labour is 
lessened. This redresses the original situation. The second advantage is that they can 
exchange the iron objects they produce in the sub-markets that are not controlled effectively 
by the elites. In short; new job – better conditions.
The results for the elites of such a tendency among the people would over time be to 
gradually erode the power of the elites, and their ability to control the markets and the 
complex society. 
7.5  Metals and the free trading sub-market
The importance of metals to society is fundamental in several ways. In LBA gold, silver, 
copper and tin (or bronze) can be seen as the life-blood of the region, functioning as the 
prime convertible value for exchange in the market. These metals can also be stored as assets, 
re-used or managed and are thus resources in a general economic manner, as well as the 
physical means to make objects of use in a utilitarian manner, such as tools, weapons, 
monuments etc. (Sherratt, 2000).
Metals can thus be seen as powerful, and this is the reason that elites chose to 
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regulate access to them, and distribution of them. Exchange of metals was arranged at the 
highest level in society, between societies. In practice this was often from ruler to ruler (King 
or Emperor). The exchange could for example be arranged by letter (on baked clay tablets) 
between interested parties at elite level. This would be the basis of the following exchange, 
but some risks remained (e.g. the ship wreck at Ulu Burun). This is an example of the market 
at work. But this was an inflexible market, and vulnerable in at least the way it could function 
with respect to social changes. This would also have been in the elites' interests.
But there was also a “lower level” market, free of elite control, for exchange of 
pottery, etc. It is likely that this market would have been able to exchange pottery for finished 
and other goods that were not normally within the remit of the elites (Sherratt, 2000:83-87). 
In the case of this market, bronze could probably be exchanged in smaller quantities than that 
for bulk trading, and so could iron. Large amounts (bulk shipments) of copper were unlikely 
to have been available for exchange, because it was a regulated material. Iron on the other 
hand, was probably not a regulated material in the 13th century.
The cargo on board the wreck of the ship at Ulu Burun was a high value consignment 
of articles within the remit of trading for the elites e.g. bulk metals, and was probably a 
shipment from one elite to another (Sherratt, 2000: 83, 87; Sherratt & Sherrat, 2001:29). The 
wreck has been dated at about 1305 BC, and contained oxhide ingots of copper and other 
elite items, unlike the Cape Gelidonya wreck from about 1200 BC, which contained a main 
cargo of scrap metal. This type of cargo probably increased in size and frequency, with 
respect to elite cargo shipments. We might assume that the sub-market was functioning well. 
Perhaps so well that it was threatening the prestigious elite gifting system, since it was 
beyond centralised control. Iron also fits into this picture, of maritime routes and increasing 
circulation of precious metals, in a market system below the elite market (Sherratt, 2000).
The maritime network in the final stages of LBA and the early IA extended from 
ports in the the coastal areas around Italy, with bronze goods such as swords from Europe to 
the north, or more similar locally produced items. These would have been acquired by 
mercantile agents and moved on boats to ports, or smaller harbours along the coasts of the 
Adriatic and the Tyrrhenian Seas, to Crete and the Aegean, and to Anatolia and Cyprus, as 
well as the Levantine coast and possibly the Black Sea. This network was probably 
dominated by agents established in the coastal towns of Cyprus, where it was probable that 
they would be outside the controlling influence of the elites in the region (Sherratt, 2000).
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7.6  Metallurgical development, society, religion and power
Blacksmiths, or the function of working iron in a professional capacity on a regular basis, can 
have existed from the times of the working of meteoric iron, but it was probably usual for the 
palace-based smiths to work both bronze and iron. The elites controlled access to raw copper, 
and probably also tin, and thereby the access to bronze for the population in general. The 
elites gained this control by using the role of the sacred to regulate society, sanctify 
individuals and implement the exploitation of base resources. In other words to encourage 
and use religious beliefs among the population to regulate behaviour, instigate and promote 
the implementation of a fiefdom, with thus the most effective exploitation of base resources 
(Knapp, 1996; 1988; 1986:115-118).
On Cyprus, metallurgy was linked with a well organized and extensive range of 
religious imagery and practices. This ideology was used to justify higher status in society and 
from the 17th century a socio-political elite arose that thereafter controlled metallurgical 
activity (Knapp, 1986:115-118). In Cyprus, in the 17th to 15th century BC, society became 
stratified, the development of the economy was regulated, and there was increasing social 
complexity. There was also considerable resistance to social changes. The archaeological 
record shows that this resistance was resolved, and a centralised regime was established, 
ruling over much of the island (if not the whole). This system validated the politico-economic 
basis of the authority implemented by some groups in the society. By LBA on Cyprus, the 
religious ideology implemented by these elites had been a part of the manoeuvring that 
enabled them to gain complete control over the copper industry (Knapp, 1986:117-118). As 
Knapp says, this established a mutually enforcing system whereby power created religion, 
and then religion stabilised power.
 There is no reason to think that this coupling to religion was unique to Cyprus. It 
may well have been common to most states in the region. The belief by society in divine 
figures who protected, encouraged and perhaps demanded sacrifice of some sort, probably 
established the basic perception that divinity, priests and magic-making were part-and-parcel 
of the whole world of metallurgy.
Enkomi (Cyprus) has yielded 2 “god-figures”, the Ingot God  and the Horned God. 
The latter is quite large, at 55 cm, and was probably worshipped in Enkomi in a Mycenaean 
type megaron, before the populace moved the town to Salamis, on the coastline of Famagusta 
Bay. The Ingot God was probably worshipped in a type of Syro-Palestinian temple in Enkomi 
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(Mountjoy and Gowland, 2005; Negbi, 2005:26).
Perhaps the political developments may not seem to be significantly affected by iron 
technology, but as previously said, technology is a social phenomenon wholly embedded 
within society. It must therefore be understood that there will be feedback between society's 
needs and technological development and the possibilities offered to society's cultural 
development by advances in technological development (Doonan, 1994).
The transition from the BA to the IA was a period of new and fundamental social 
transformation. The elite controlled economies gave way to less centralised forms of 
economic reality and arrangement which were essential for the next phases of increased 
growth in the region. The collapse of the palaces (and their stranglehold on economic growth) 
led to a devolution of economic executive power to lower levels. The developments were 
both technological and social, inseparably bound in the new arrangements with their own 
logic and ambitions (Sherratt and Sherratt, 2001: 361-363).
Summary:
The changes that took place in the LBA were fundamental, and unleashed new social 
forces in the eastern Mediterranean. These changes had already began in the centuries before 
the collapse, but were only noticeable in the final stage of LBA, with the collapse. Their 
result was the end of control of high value bulk materials by the elite. Previously controlled at 
the elite level, and only released to lower levels of administration or craftsmen/women 
controlled by the elites, they were thereafter released by the elites' fall.
7.7  Modern technology versus ancient alchemy – magic and myth
It is assumed that modern technology is so well known as to obviate any formal definition 
here. To differentiate between modern technology and the working of metallurgy in ancient 
times, the term alchemy is used here for ancient metal working. Alchemy is a name that  
originated in Byzantium and was given by its practitioners for “the Art”, and which probably 
included aspects of magic (Keyser, 1990).  Alchemy has after a promising start, experienced a 
“difficult childhood” in the Middle Ages, but now people see it as a science that has rendered 
good service to mankind in the past (Principe, 2011).
 Alchemy probably provoked a major reaction from pre-neolithic people who 
investigated the effects of fire on all sorts of materials, including metals. Texture, phase 
changes from solid to liquid state and vice versa, as well as colour changes. It is from this not 
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difficult to imagine how impressive and magical processes using pyrotechnics can be, and 
how useful to people in pre-history (Keyser, 1990).
The term “magic” is defined in an original work by Mauss (1872-1950), in France. In 
this thesis the translation by Robert Brain (Mauss, 1972) is used. In general magic is a cult 
modelled on religious cults, that occurs in private, secret or mysterious circumstances, yet 
occupies a place in social customs. Magical rites are often carried out in “out of the way” 
places, such as woods, caves, remote houses, in darkness or at night, and always in secret. 
They differ in this from religious rites which are carried out in open, public places (Mauss, 
1972:23). 
 In early alchemy there was probably not a systematic approach to the methods 
required to exploit the new resource. Humans had to learn for themselves how to work it, and 
how best to put it to use. They probably had to invent and learn (memorise) many different 
protocols. This probably involved some religious or cult aspects, as well as local cultural 
elements. But in its beginnings it was a matter of religion and/or magic (and perhaps some 
superstition). The practice was to mix various elements, minerals and energy to achieve the 
desired result. This was mostly about metals, and the most precious metals were of greatest 
interest (Dubs, 1947). It has been said that iron at an early date was the most precious in 
Anatolia, and of great interest to the palace-based smiths and priests of the elite controlled 
complex societies. It is possible that since most early iron was meteoric and came from the 
heavens, it might have acquired some religious or magical characteristic.
Man's first successful experiences with the forming of metals was to achieve the 
smelting of them, whereby they were reduced to liquid state by the application of fire 
(energy), and then e.g. formed by crude moulding, perhaps on bare earth. The multitude of 
colours and various degrees of hardness must have been most impressive. Metals were 
discovered in the 6th millenium and methods of transforming them well advanced by 2000 
BC, in the region from central Anatolia to the edges of the Iranian desert (Wertime, 1964).
Briggs (1980) argues that mining for metals has, since its inception, always been of 
great interest to humanity. The business of extraction of metals has also been of great 
advantage to the human race, and there is also the aspect of “the hunt for treasure embedded 
in the bosom of mother earth”. He also points out that alchemy only gave way to technology 
and science in the 18th and 19th centuries (AD). He also states that in his opinion the 
engineers involved in the Industrial Revolution in England had a higher status than they have 
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in modern times (1980). If this is representative also for ancient times, then people involved 
in alchemy would probably also have had high status at that time.
Modern perception of metallurgy in ancient times has probably been affected by 
Childe (1944), who was a protagonist of a certain idealistic view. He set up a framework that 
has come to guide modern archaeologists in their basic perception of ancient metallurgy. In 
his article Childe stressed his idea of “industrialisation”, although this did not exist in the 
early ancient times of metallurgy, when the τέχνη (art) went through its first 4-5000 years of 
development (at least in Anatolia). 
Application of the modern “industrial model”, whereby rational science is considered 
the driving force behind technological development, still characterises understandings of the 
alchemy of the ancients. Modern concepts of industrialisation and mass levels of standardised 
production are probably inappropriate as a basis for understanding production in the ancient 
world. Where standardisation may appear to have occurred in cases of a series of similar 
products, it could easily be explained by re-use of old moulds, types of tools commonly used, 
making new moulds from older castings, or cultural reasons (Budd and Taylor, 1995).
Insomuch as the gender issue is concerned, both explicit and implicit in Childe's 
work, the model doesn't ring true, that it was a man's work only, since children of both sexes 
were employed in the mines in England in the early Industrial Revolution. If children can do 
it so can grown women. In the case of the ancient world, family groups were active in 
gathering ore and various other tasks. This sort of tasking would have built on cooperation 
from all individuals. Even the responsibility for child care, often seen in modern times as a 
female responsibility, can't have been impossible to organise in a metal using society (Budd 
and Taylor, 1995:136-8).
To gain a greater insight it is necessary to subsume or remove those principles, and in 
greater degree focus on the ritual and magical perspectives of the ancients. These ancient 
perceptions should have a much greater place in modern interpretation and generation of 
hypotheses (Budd and Taylor, 1995:133). It seems clear that if these aspects are ignored we 
risk discounting the quality of  their work in alchemy, religious (priestly) smithies and 
women as alchemists, as well as the power of the leaders of the alchemy movement to sway 
the ancient peoples' thoughts and opinions.
  In short, metal-making was a non-scientific business, which was both variable and 
carried out synchronous to, or alongside other social activities of all kinds. In such 
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conditions, the complex activities would be ritualised. They were non-literary societies and 
would necessarily have had to remember everything, so there would have been need for 
memory aids, and therefore formulated “spells” that all would remember, and use to carry out 
various tasks. From this, it is a short step from metal-making to magic-making. This would 
have been enhanced with the magnificent colourful shows that might be put on with 
pyrotechnics! That should impress anybody. So it should be no surprise to find that the smith, 
political leader and magician all live in the body of one person, female or male, who 
commands respect from all others in the society. Once power and charisma were installed as a 
part of awe-inspiring alchemy there is no reason why it should have been discontinued (Budd 
and Taylor, 1995:138-9).
7.8  Magicians and metallurgy
The ability to work magic has been linked to social aspects such as class and occupation. A 
person cannot become a magician on their own, but must be seen as a magician by other 
people. That person will then be able to take on the qualities of a magician, in most cases also 
seem to become another person. This is not confined to men, and in fact women are more 
likely to be recognised as magicians by society. Children are also seen as particularly good in 
the role of magician's assistant, as long as they have not passed through initiatory rites. Other 
types of social positions which are often regarded as magicians are blacksmiths, shepherds 
and doctors (i.e. qualified medical practitioners). Their use of so very complex techniques 
(for human benefit) makes their activities seem marvellous and supernatural (Mauss, 
1972:26-31).
The use of rites, spells and magicians possibly had a similar effect in alchemy. In the 
period of interest the intention was exploitation of iron, but it could easily have been the case 
with copper production, earlier. Then, as in iron production, the groups were probably 
smaller, and there was no elite group ruling over the entire society in the name of a god. 
The development of alchemy and the production of iron, possibly with the expansion 
of a new class of artisans and cult leaders (or priests) and “headmen” who were able to sway 
a growing segment of the community. Their new deities and the practice of magical 
procedures could possibly have gained more influence in the population and led to a lesser 
support of the established elites. A part of this could have been growth in the number of sites 
for mining and production.
The requirements for pyrotechnics and iron production lent themselves to many 
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small, non-centralised sites, especially in that the location of mines could not be controlled. 
That was decided by geology, i.e. the location and access to the deposits. The small 
settlements on such sites would have supported those that worked there. This type of site 
would have been difficult for the elites to control, and those who lived or worked there.
The introduction or increase of iron goods in the low-level markets, which already 
facilitated the exchange of pottery and metal objects would have perhaps caused a rapid 
expansion. Possibly also helped by an uneven demand for bronze. All this would have “fed 
back” into the economic system and strengthened the need and desire to fall back on a lower 
level of complexity, as defined by Tainter earlier.
In short too many of the people didn't want the elite societies to continue, or 
preferred to develop the lower level markets. This could have weakened the elite controlled 
economy, and the elites' ability to control their domains. As for the metal, iron could have 
proved to be preferential to a considerably larger number of people. Despite its being lesser 
hard than bronze, and its appearance, less shiny than bronze, but absolutely good enough for 
their uses. The end result would have been more people practising freer commercial 
activities, in competition with the bigger, elite controlled economies.
7.9  Conclusions
Iron was a prestigious material in the BA to early LBA, when the raw material was meteoric 
iron, probably collected from the landscape, possibly at high cost, and solely owned by elites. 
Once it began to be made from its ores, its popularity probably declined, because ordinary 
people could have had it too. It's not a luxury, prestigious object if non-elites possess it.
Self-styled, independent alchemists among the people had probably begun to produce 
utilitarian iron from its ores on a small scale (in “out of the way” settlements) well before the 
collapse in 1200 BC, possibly as early as the start of the LBA, or before. Parallel with the 
economic growth of the LBA, the iron was produced and used as tools, jewellery, exchange 
items and maybe some weapons, among ordinary people. Considering its humble beginnings, 
and its tendency to rust and disintegrate, it was probably of little interest to the elites, but 
filled some of the requirements of ordinary people in their lives and work. When objects were 
lost, they rusted away, so they are not in the archaeological record. When the the collapse 
occurred, there was probably an increased incentive on alchemists to produce more utilitarian 
iron.
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There was a connection between the collapse of the centralised elite controlled 
economy and the new resource base, utilitarian iron. This “function”, concerning activities in 
iron production and distribution, prevented the re-emergence of centralised economies. 
Which in effect meant that after the collapse, control of high value bulk materials was 
devolved from palaces to lower levels, e.g. temples, and mercantile enterprises, who then 
became the main traders. The production of utilitarian iron was not under palace control, so 
any group, company or society could engage in producing iron wares (if they had the 
necessary knowledge and resources). The alchemists producing iron probably moved to a 
more “centre stage” position in society.
There may have been some shortage of tin in the region at some point near the end of 
LBA. But it seems likely that this could only have given increased incentive to alchemists 
who were already producing iron wares. It seems eminently clear that bronze was a better 
material for most uses than iron was at that time, so it must have become more popular than 
bronze despite its apparent failure to be harder than bronze. Perhaps the production and use 
of iron wares put more control of their circumstances into the peoples' own hands.
 At that time, there was increasing dysfunction in society. For the Hittites this was 
perhaps a result of the infighting that occurred in the central dynastic family. Some of the 
Hittite kings were unable to deal adequately with this, so the problems could have 
accumulated and spread down into the general population. The ordinary people were 
probably disenchanted with the complex societies they lived in, in much of the region.
As the crisis in the economy grew in the 13th century BC, the exchange system 
between the elites faltered. This system was being gradually weakened by the popular use of 
traditional sub-markets, where small item exchanges were already common. There was also 
the increasing movement of goods on ships owned and operated by a small but new class of 
entrepreneurs, commercially freighting and selling wares, such as the Gelidonya wreck.
As the crisis developed, the Hittites, who were the first to develop iron, were also the 
first to collapse.  The people dispersed, possibly adding to the general confusion and 
difficulties of discerning between migrating people, “Sea People” and other groups.
 This perception of iron was gradually developed, but was a strong influence. It was based on 
a mixture of social conditions, changes in metallurgy, and changes in belief systems. This 
mixture fed back into society over a long period of time, possibly from the early 13th century 
BC, or maybe earlier. It affected the lives of people, because it offered an alternative to them, 
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when they needed it. Then, as the crisis' first tremors were noticed by them, it could help 
offset the inevitable social and economic changes. Following that, iron would probably have 
been the only relatively easily obtainable metal, and rapidly popular. The events in society in 
the eastern Mediterranean in the latter part of LBA also accelerated the metallurgical 
developments within iron technology.
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Appendix
Figure 1.  Migration map showing migrations, destructions, and general disturbances in the 
eastern Mediterranean in the 13th century. The Sea Peoples have been proposed as 
the "culprits" for some of these events, but the matter is controversial.
Source: 
http://qed.princeton.edu/main/Image:Invasions_and_Migrations_in_the
_Mediterranean_c._1200_BC.jpg
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Figure 2: Open furnace of clay, partly buried in soil, with bellows, crucible, 
iron grips, rocks to crush the ore, ore and burning charcoal in furnace.
Figure 3:  A shaft type furnace for metal smelting
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Figure 4: Part of a crucible (lower part) broken to show slag (black upper layer), copper 
prills forming in the lower slag, as well as holes evacuated by copper prills 
(lost in breakage of crucible). The crucible shows some damage from the 
furnace.
Figure 5: Finds of iron objects from the Bronze Age and the 3 centuries 1200 to 900 BC 
(source Waldbaum, 1978).
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Figure 6: Finds of iron in the eastern Mediterranean distributed geographically, for 
Palestine,Syria, Cyprus and Greece (including Crete and Islands). Source 
Waldbaum (1978:36)
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